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DISABILITY, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE SUPREME
COURT: STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS OF
PROGRESSIVE AND RETROGRESSIVE LOGIC IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CLASSIFICATIONt
Anita Silvers*
Michael Ashley Stein**

This Article compares'current disability jurisprudence with the development of sex
equality jurisprudence in the area of discrimination. It demonstrates that current
disability law resembles the abandoned, sexist framework for determining sex
equality and argues that disability equality cases should receive similar analysis
as the more progressive, current sex equality standard. As such, the Article attempts to synthesize case law (14th Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence)
and statutory law (Title VII and the ADA) into a comprehensive overview of the
state of current disability law viewed within the context of discrimination law in
general.

INTRODUCTION

Disability as a classification for equal protection stands at a
jurisprudential crossroads. :rhe path traveled by the Supreme
Court in the handful of cases addressing individuals with disabilities, whether Justice Holmes's infamous justification of state
imposed sterilization on the ground that "[t]hree generations of
1
imbeciles are enough," or its more recent holdings interpreting

t
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1.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207 (1927).
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provlSlons under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) , is
analogous to the course pursued by the Court more than half a
3
century ago when adjudicating women's rights.
Specifically, the Court adopted biological classifications for dis4
ability and sex, respectively, that were rooted in empirically
incorrect stereotypes established by social convention, rather than
based in fact. 5 Yet over the intervening half century, limitations on
women's participation in society, based on unfounded stereotypes
about their biological differences, have come to be viewed as unacceptable.6 Enabling this transformation was a shift in the legal
conceptualization of sex-based roles, facilitated by the Supreme
Court's adoption of an empirically grounded methodology for
claims about women and their abilities. For instance, the 1973
7
Frontiero v. Richardson decision held as a general empirically verified proposition that one's sex was frequently unrelated "to ability
8
to perform or contribute to society. " The Court's 1982 ruling in
9
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan observed that certain sexbased differential treatment was not factually verifiable as related
to an important governmental interest and was thus merely a codi10
fication of empirically unsubstantiated social conventions. As a
result, notions that automatically assigned women to certain roles,
2.

42 U.S.C. § 12001 (1994). The Court's ADA opinions are set forth below in Part

III.B.
3.
Discussed below in Part I.
4.
The term "sex" refers to biological difference, as opposed to "gender" which refers
to assigned social roles. See SUSAN S.M. EDWARDS, SEX AND GENDER IN THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1996); Katherine O'Donovan, Legal Construction of Sex and Gender, in SouRCEBOOK ON
FEMINIST jURISPRUDENCE 171 (1997). A more general perspective is provided in KATHARINE
T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAw: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (2d
ed. 1998).
5.
A strong analogy also extends to race. Nevertheless, popular treatment of sex and
disability (as opposed to race) dovetails more closely in that they are grounded in paternalism rather than in animus, see generaUy Michael Ashley Stein, Empluying People with Disabilities:
Some Cautionary Thoughts for a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAw, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
REsEARCH 51 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) [hereinafter Stein, Empluying People With Disabilities]. As such, the majority of our assertions about disability classification are formulated
through comparisons with the historical treatment of women.
6.
See generaUy jUDITH A BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD
EQUALITY FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT (2d ed. 1996); ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1975);
ALBERT KRICHMAR, THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1848-1970
(1972); WOMEN's RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Winston E.
Langley & Vivian C. Fox eds., 1994).
7.
411 u.s. 677 (1973).
8.
!d. at 686.
458 u.s. 718, 718 (1982).
9.
10.
Ironically, the issue in Hogan was a policy of the state-sponsored university limiting
enrollment in its nursing program to women. !d.
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and precluded their participation in others based on stereotypes of
their deficient competence, have been replaced by a standard
which assumes that women as a class are as competent as men,
notwithstanding that there are sub-classes of women who are not
11
competent to perform some of the same tasks as most men.
Thus, for over the past half century, jurisprudential methodology
for deciding what properties are, in fact, collectively characteristic of
women has progressed by adopting an empirically-based framework
for making these judgments. No similar transformation has advanced jurisprudential methodology in regard to the disability
12
classification. A medical account of disability, one that resembles
outdated medical views about the inherent frailty of women's bod13
ies and instability of their minds and emotions, remains
influential in legal thinking. This persistence occurs despite
mounting evidence, increasingly acknowledged in political, cultural, and academic realms, of the errors in equating biological
14
atypicality with inherent limitation and inability. This evidence
11.
An explanatory foomote on nomenclature is warranted. Throughout this Article,
we give "incompetent" its common meaning of not possessing the necessary ability or capacity, rather than its specialized legal meaning of not possessing the ability or capacity to make
decisions in one's own interest. We do, however, borrow the contextualization of competence from its legal usage. Thus, for us, competence is to be assessed relative to the kinds of
activities in which an individual proposes to engage. For example, L.C., the plaintiff in
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), which we discuss in greater detail in Part III, was competent to live in the community and receive medical services there. Some disability
advocates may fear the implications for seriously disabled individuals, especially for mentally
retarded people, of disconnecting the disability classification from characterizations of
incompetence. To the contrary, doing so permits our thinking about these groups to expand by attending to how they express their personal agency. For instance, in EEOC v. CEC
Entertainment, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (W.D. Wis. March 14, 2000), an ADA employment action against the Chuck E. Cheese's restaurant chain, plaintiff was a retarded
speech-impaired worker. Nevertheless, the court permitted the case to turn on evidence of
the plaintiff's competent execution of his work and his competent choice to hold a job. I d.
at *2, 15-17.
12.
Particularly notable among the voluminous literature describing this model of disability are the writings of Paul K. Longmore and Harlan Hahn. A succinct exegesis is
provided in Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution
ofFederal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1993).
See generally Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Is13.
sues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97 (1994).
See Joetta L. Sack, State Board Candidate Sets out to Defy Expectations, 17 EDUCATION
14.
WEEK 36 (May 20, 1998), (recounting how Abbey Marie Sanchez, a college graduate with
Down Syndrome, ran for election to the New Mexico Board of Education); Michael Arkush,
'Life' Fulfills her Dream, L.A. TIMES, March 28, 1992, at F1 (describing the soap opera acting
career of Andrea Friedman, a person with Down Syndrome). A good overview of what life
with Down Syndrome may be like is provided, autobiographically, by jASON KINGSLEY &
MITCHELL LEVITZ, COUNT Us IN: GROWING UP WITH DOWN SYNDROME (1994). Although
generally sanguine, the authors disagree with each other over the extent to which social
awareness has improved.
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has not overcome the continuing authority granted to the conceptual conventions of welfarist legal categories which cast people
with disabilities in the role of social incompetents who are charac15
teristically dependent upon public assistance. As a result of these
static underlying assumptions, the methodology for assessing disability as a classification still depends on out-of-date notions rooted
in empirically unsubstantiated social conventions.
One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon was the
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
16
Center, Inc., where the Court explicitly relied on custom and an
existing welfarist statute to characterize the disability classification.17 The Court failed to notice that the statute in question was
based on unsubstantiated assumptions about disabled people's
limitations and found it unnecessary to rule whether the permit
requirement was facially invalid when the mentally retarded are
18
involved. The effect of allowing this retrogressive method of
equating biological anomaly with generalized limitation has been
the imposition of a disability classification that presupposes in19
competence.
The legislative history and findings of the ADA clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to rebut the assumptions underlying
the Cleburne decision and establish for the disabled an antidiscrimination classification methodology analogous to that applied
15.
See infra Part III.
16.
473 u.s. 432 (1985).
In Cleburne, the Court ruled that "the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental re·
17.
tardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial
review." /d. at 442. Consequently, statutes and practices that disadvantage mentally retarded
people by treating them differently do not have to meet the standard of substantially furthering an important governmental purpose. Instead, the classification need only be
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose because individuals in the "group affected ...
have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement." /d. at 441. While it is true that the different standards of scrutiny partially account for
the different ways in which the Court treats the sex and disability classifications, we argue
that the Court's basis for applying different standards is flawed. We argue that in Cleburne
and in subsequent decisions that deal with the disability classification, the Court uses retrogressive thinking, reminiscent of its earlier mistaken thinking about the characteristics of
women, to mistakenly attribute characteristics that would justify disadvantageous differential
treatment to the population of the disability classification. If the Court's thinking about the
distinguishing characteristics of the population of the disability classification is mistaken, as
we argue here, its basis for denying that differential treatment of the classified group need
not meet the heightened scrutiny standard of substantially furthering an important governmental purpose is undercut.
18.
/d. at 447-50. The Cleburne decision, and its consequences, are discussed in Part II.
For a more thorough treatment of the artificial nature of limitations, see Anita Silvers, Furmal justice, in ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON jUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (I998).
19.
We elaborate on this point in Parts I and II.
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to groups differentiated on the basis of race or sex. Nevertheless,
Congress was negligent when drafting the statute, for it adopted
without alteration (in part as the result of a political compromise
among cross-disability rights groups and groups that represent
21
people with specific disabilities) the definition of disability from
22
the Rehabilitation Act. As a result, although the definition itself
was meant to be neutral, that is, not read within the context of the
Rehabilitation Act, the legal-cultural accretion of established welfarist classification continues to influence post-ADA Supreme
Court decisions. Accordingly, the prevailing characterization of
people with disabilities as a group is one ofincompetence. 2 g
The current disability classification, therefore, is analogous to
the retrogressive conceptualization of sex that is now acknowledged as "outmoded." The Supreme Court's disparate
jurisprudence regarding the constitutional classification of groups
of biologically different individuals is not, however, unavoidable.
As a matter of logical consistency and out of concern for judicial
uniformity, the Court could acknowledge and amend the retrogressive methodology that continues to be applied to people with
the biological differences that historically have been called disabilities.
Specifically, the Court could hold that when examining statutes
or practices affecting the disabled, courts should begin from the
same baseline utilized for assessing the rights of women.
Subsequent examination of whether disabled individuals in
general, as distinct from a carefully drawn and substantiated subcategory of the classification, are biologically unable to execute
particular social functions would the·n be grounded in an
empirical analysis rather than reliant upon social convention. Such
action would be in line with the judicial conservatism typifying the
24
majority of the current Justices,
for it would compel
methodological consistency in the Court's treatment of groups that
20.
Discussed below in Part III.
See generaUy Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
21.
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991);
Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64
TEMP. L. REv. 471 (1991).
22.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974). The tripartate definition is also utilized in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
23.
See infra Part lll.
24.
See Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995)
(criticizing the Court's unquestioning reliance "on the abstract meaning of a particular
word or phrase").
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are candidates for constitutional protection from discrimination.
Nor would application of this standard require the Court to
engage in dramatic social engineering, for only empirically proven
premises about the disabled would be upheld.
Thus, we propose a uniform methodology that appeals to fact
rather than to custom. While some legal scholars hold that all legal
25
categories are nothing more than social construction, we believe
that no legal classification should impose unsubstantiated or
stereotypical beliefs about the definitive characteristics of members
of the class, or beliefs that cannot be generalized, even if such be26
liefs are customary or culturally embedded. Our point here being
strictly methodological, we have not attempted to construct the
27
disability class or determine its attributes. We treat these aspects
elsewhere, with particular attention to the analogues between disability and genetic identity and race in the social construction of
28
. classifications. For now, simply as a matter of juridical uniformity,
we assert that the criteria for establishing whether a classification
of citizens is accurately drawn should be applied in an unbiased
and logically consistent manner.
We demonstrate that the methodology utilized by the Court in
regard to the disability classification does not meet even this standard. Instead, the Court continues to rely upon an outmoded
framework that is incompatible with the model they apply to
25.
For example, Kimberle Crenshaw argues that even classifications meant to protect
against social prejudice are not themselves free from bias because they are artifacts of a
biased society. Thus, individuals who fall into the intersect of two minority categories, such
as black women, may not be protected by legislation designed for either group because they
are situated differently from white women with respect to suffering from sex-based harms,
and differently from black men with respect to suffering from employment-related harms.
See generaUy Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race,
Reft:mn, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 1331 (1988).
26.
Thus, we agree with commentators asserting the social origins of many categories,
but diverge from them to the extent that we believe classifications can and ought to be
based upon empirical fact. See generaUy CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL
CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE ROOTS (1988); Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1237; Ian F. Haney Lop.ez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Obseroations on musions, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1 (1994).
27.
We also do not enter into the debate over the proper role of the Court in interpreting congressional intent. For differing accounts of what that role ought to be, see
generaUy WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(2000); AI!NERj. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997); Ruth Colker &James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100
MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001 ).
Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic Dis28.
crimination, 55 VANDERBILT LAw REviEW (forthcoming). The authors of this Article will pursue
the analogue to race in a future collaboration.
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women's biological differences. Consequently, we suggest an approach through which the Supreme Court can amend its
retrogressive methodology and achieve jurisprudential consistency.
Part I of this Article compares concepts of discrimination arising
from individuals' sex and disabilities as expressed in two contrasted Supreme Court opinions. Although facially dissimilar, both
cases were governed by views restricting the social participation of
certain individuals based on their group identities.
Part II continues this examination by explicating and critiquing
the Court's classification of disability in Cleburne. This framework
established incompetence as a presumptive characteristic of membership in the disability classification.
Part III describes Congress's intent to respond to the Cleburne
framework in discrimination classification, as evidenced in its formulation of the ADA. In spite of this objective, Congress's
wholesale adoption of the Rehabilitation Act's disability definition
into the ADA classification imported an inappropriate conceptu29
alization of disability into civil rights law. While the definition
itself is carefully neutral, the ADA has inherited not only the definition's language but also the social and juridical interpretations
that contextualize it in the context of the Rehabilitation Act. The
repercussions of that bequest are demonstrated by the post-ADA
decisions wherein the Court has continued to apply the Cleburne
framework which presumes incompetence as the dominant characteristic of a disability classification. As a result, judicial treatment of
disability as a classification diverges illogically from its handling of
other constitutional classifications.
Part IV advocates that the Court correct its logically inconsistent
classification of biologically different groups by applying a uniform
methodology. Such emendation will not result in special protections for the disabled. Rather, it will extend to that group the same
model of factual enquiry applied to other classifications correlated
with biological difference.
In conclusion, Part V defends the Court against the charge of
mistaking socially conventional classifications for natural kinds and
argues that the Court's retrogressive logic is prompted by exactly
the reverse error. RectifYing such error requires commitment to
the principle that empirical reality overrides the stipulation of social conventions, as well as willingness to study how the general
facts about the capabilities of disabled people have evolved over
time.
29.

See infra Part III.
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COMPARING CONCEPTS OF SEX

AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

30

31

In Goesart v. Cleary, the Supreme Court upheld as obvious the
constitutionality of a Michigan statute requiring that bartenders be
32
licensed but prohibiting the licensing of women as "barmaids,"
unless they were either the spouses or daughters of male liquor
33
establishment owners. The Court deemed Michigan reasonable
in excluding all women lacking patronage from close male family
34
members from this profession. Despite acknowledging that the
preceding (depression and war) years had brought "vast" social
35
and legal changes to women's status, the Court held that to restrict a profes'!>ion mainly to men by state action does not violate
the Constitution because equal protection does not mean equal
treatment for individuals whose situations are "different in fact or
• •
,36
opm10n.
No matter how adroit a woman might be at pouring drinks, or
how competent at tallying sums, to the Court her situation could
37
not help but be different from a man's. For the justices, the mere
thought of a female dispensing drinks evoked the image of a
38
"sprightly and ribald" Shakespearean alewife. They believed that
the mere presence of a female dispensing intoxicating beverages
behind a bar could not help but raise "moral and social problems"
39
which the state intended to prevent. Only the "oversight" of a
male with special interest in both the woman's welfare and the protection of bar room property, "assured through ownership of a bar

30.
335 u.s. 464 (1948).
31. Justice Frankfurter opined that the issue raised "need not detain us long," for it "is
one of those rare instances where to state the question is in effect to answer it." I d. at 465.
32.
Presumably the female equivalent of a male bartender, the Court refers to this job
description as "a historic calling," once essential to the "social life of England." Id. Ironically,
although this term does not appear in the gender-neutral language of the Michigan statute,
1945 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 133, Sec. 19a, it is also utilized by Goesart's counsel. See Appellants' Brief, Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (on file with authors).
33.
The statute applied to cities having populations of 50,000 or more. Goesart, 335
U.S. at 465 (citing 1945 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 133, § 19a).
34.
/d. at 466.
35.
These advances are described by the Court as "[t]he fact that women may now
have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge
in vices that men have long practiced ... ." /d.
36.
/d. (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) ).
37.
See id. at 465.
38.
ld.
39.
/d. at 466.
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40

by a barmaid's husband or father," could be trusted to minimize
"hazards" otherwise confronting an unprotected barmaid. 41
Because the line drawn by the Michigan legislature was not
42
wholly lacking reason, the Court held that the disadvantage that
the statute imposed on most women did not call its constitutionality into question. However possibly "unchivalrous" or exclusionary
43
it might be, equal protection consideration could not reach this
44
purpose because the state had a rational interest both in protecting women from the limitations of their ability to defend
45
themselves and in protecting the public from disruptions provoked by the mere presence of women in a potentially raucous,
46
uncontrolled environment.
Fifty years later, the Supreme Court first addressed the ADA in
47
Bragdon v. Abbott. In Bragdon, the Court held that Abbott, an HIVpositive dental patient, was disabled within the terms of the statute
and therefore protected from disability discrimination. While the
ultimate significance of the ruling has been subject to varying interpretations,48 the assumptions underlying the decision are
revealing. The Court found that Abbott, although asymptomatic,
was disabled. The ADA's application of the Equal Protection
Clause's general requirement of access to public accommodation
compelled Bragdon to fill Abbott's cavities in his office rather than
49
in a hospital setting, unless objective medical evidence confirmed
Bragdon's trepidation that treating Abbott in the office as other
patients were treated fell beyond the ADA's reach because it
40.
41.
42.

!d.
!d.
The distinction between requiring women to withdraw from tending bar but not
from serving as waitresses, was likewise challenged on Constitutional grounds, but summarily dismissed. !d. at 465 ( 1948).
43.
Presumably the legislature's desire was to give returning male veterans a monopoly on the occupation of bartending. For an account of the role of women in the labor force
during World War II, see PENNY COLMAN, ROSIE THE RIVETER: WOMEN WORKING ON THE
HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II (1995); SHERNA BERGER GLUCK, ROSIE THE RIVETER REVISITED: WOMAN, THE WAR, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1987).
44.
Goesart, 335 U.S. at 466.
45.
!d.
46.
!d.
47.
524 u.s. 624 (1998).
48.
A thoughtful treatment of this issue is pursued by Mark Kelman, Does Disability
Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAw FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). Two
other especially good analyses are Samuel A Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability,
86 VA. L. REv. 397 (2000), and Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative
Capability, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1279 (2000).
49.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
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50
constituted a "direct threat" to his welfare. As to this last matter,
the Court remanded the case for a factual finding, but this action
was largely pro forma, for the Center for Communicable Diseases
and the American Dental Association were on record as finding
1
ordinarily available office setting precautions to be adequate. 5
Why, then, did Abbott's biological difference, an asymptomatic
52
HIV infection, classify her as disabled? The Court found that it
3
substantially limited a maJor life activity, reproduction. 5
There was no question, however, regarding Abbot's biological
ability to reproduce, which even individuals with fully developed
AIDS can do. As in Goesart, the issue in Bragdon turned on the social import of a biological difference: in Goesart the social
implications of the difference between bar patrons' responses to
female and male physiology; in Bragdon the social implications of
the difference between being infected or not infected by the HIV
virus.
Central to the Court's reasoning is not that Abbott could not
reproduce, but rather that she ought not to do so, for fear of
transmitting her infection to either a male partner or to their offspring.54 For, although conception and childbirth were "not
impossible" for individuals with HIV, they were unquestionably
"dangerous to the public health," thus meeting the ADA's defini5
tion of a substantial limitation. 5 The Court wrote as if Abbott had
56
recourse only to traditional methods of reproduction, and therefore was unavoidably subject to the specific risks incurred through
50.
I d. at 648.
51.
I d. at 650--52.
52.
Even more oddly, why was a connection made between the unrelated acts of reproduction to cavity filling? I d. at 641.
53.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. This in itself is interesting for it touches upon the highly
contested (albeit unresolved) issue of whether infertility ought to be covered by insurance
so far as the ADA is concerned. See generaUy Stephen T. Kaminski, Must Empluyers Pay for Viagra? An Americans with Disabilities Analysis Post-Bragdon and Sutton, 4 DEPAUL]. HEALTH CARE
L. 73 (2000). On the broader issue of the effects of the ADA upon insurance provision, see
Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy J. Wilkinson, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Managed Care,
37 Hous. L. REv. 1163 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Insurance and the ADA, 46 DEPAUL L.
REv. 915 (1997).
54.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40 (1998).
55.
!d. at 641.
56.
See generaUy Michelle R. King & Beth S. Herr, The Consequences and Implications of a
Case-By-Case Analysis Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Gay
Men and Lesbians Post Bragdon, 8 LAw & SEx 531 (1998). Moreover, Kelman wonders
whether a hypothetically post-menopausal Abbott would no longer be considered disabled
and therefore will be unprotected against disability discrimination. He asks whether it is
Abbott's (and other disabled people's) disability status rather than their being subjected to
stigmatizing treatment that really matters when delineating discrimination. See Kelman,
supra note 48.
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this method. Moreover, the Court adduced "economic and legal
consequences" pertaining to her limitation. These included the
"added costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance,
and long-term health care for the child who must be examined
58
and, tragic to think, treated for the infection," as well as the fact
that certain state laws prohibit HIV-infected people from engaging
59
in sexual relations, regardless of their partners' consent. Thus, it
was not Abbott's biological difference, but a socio-economic assessment of that difference, that limited Abbott and was a
definitive component of her disability.
Facially, the connection between these opinions may seem as far
apart as the half century intervening between their decisions. Further, in the earlier case, beliefs that take a class's biological
difference as a proxy for a social limitation defeat claims to similar
treatment, while in the latter, claims to similar treatment are sub60
stantiated precisely because of such a limitation. Yet uniting these
two opinions are similar underlying notions regarding the relation
between socially relevant competence and biological difference.
Central to both Goesart and Bragdon is identification of a class
that historically has been deprived of opportunities because its
members are imagined to be so vulnerable as to require and deserve protection from the state. Of note in this regard is the
practice of limiting the class in general because of the deficits of
some of its individual members. Thus, although some women are
unlikely to evoke raucous reactions in men, and there also are
women capable of quelling drunken disturbances, the Goesart
Court believed women to be a general risk to themselves and the
61
public if they try to preside over barrooms. It therefore held that
62
it was rational to discourage them from doing so. Similarly,
57.
The Court first asserted that an HIV infected woman "who tries to conceive a child
imposes on the man a significant risk of becoming infected," and then cited various statistics
on the probability of HIV transmission. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
58.
/d. at 641.
59.
/d.
60.
In ADA cases where plaintiffs seek access to the workplace, the Court's endorsement of biological difference as a proxy for social limitation plays out as it did for the
plaintiffs in Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). In the two nonemployment ADA cases it
has heard, the Court found for disabled plaintiffs. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). On the other hand, in all of the employmentrelated cases, the plaintiffs were denied relief. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). We analyze the remaining ADA case, Cleveland v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), in Section IV.
61.
See Goesart, 335 U.S. at 466.
62.
/d. at 467.

92

University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform

[VOL.

35:1&2

although some HIV-positive women can reproduce without transmitting their infection, the Court believed that women with HIV
63
generally risk causing harm if they try to reproduce. Even evidence of antiretroviral therapy lowering the risk of prenatal
64
transmission to eight percent did not sway the Court's belief.
Consequently, the Court appears to have concluded that not re65
producing is a rational limitation for HIV-positive people.
In Goesart, the defense of such limitation is direct. In Bragdon, it
is more subtle. Nevertheless, Bragdon, as forcefully as Goesart, presumes that an individual is significantly limited in her ability to
carry out a common activity if her biological differences make her
engagement in the activity a risk to herself or others. The same
kind of assumption that seemed so reasonable to the Court fifty
years ago as a basis for declaring women to be substantially limited
continues to seem a reasonable basis to the present Court for declaring women with HIV to be substantially limited. In both cases,
the overt issue is whether a class' members are capable of performing certain common functions, but the underlying issue is whether
the state has a rational interest in their not doing so.
The persistence of this line of reasoning should not be a surprise. Historically, courts have addressed the constitutionality of
limiting opportunity for classes delineated in terms of biological
differences by considering two related questions. First, does the
class members' biological difference relate to or signify some type
of "reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday
66
world," so that class members generally need special protection?
Second, does the class members' reduced ability to cope and func67
tion usually place the public in need of special protection?
Answering these questions turns on facts about the conditions under which class members or the public need special protection, the
frequency with which these conditions occur, and the degree to
which they can be averted. The questions are, therefore, empirical.
Consequently, courts should consider them to be open questions, with answers to be determined by establishing factual truths
about the class, rather than as questions foreclosed by reliance on
customary ideas about the disabled. What concerns us is the error
of the Court, when dealing with disability, in preempting answers
to these questions without examining the facts. This same error of
reasoning led the Goesart Court to consider women's situation suf63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 643.
!d. at 641.
!d. at 647-48.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985).
!d. at 443-44.
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ficiently different as to justify withdrawing from them the occupation of bartending. Despite acknowledging "vast changes" that had
occurred during the war years in women's social and legal position, the Goesart Court held that legislatures were not required "to
68
reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards," or "to
69
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards" when drawing lines
between the sexes. During the half-century that separates Bragdon
from Goesart, closer attention to the facts about women developed
a perspective from which the characterization of them in Goesart
70
seems "archaic and stereotypic."
Fifty years later, very little, if anything, strikes us as a society as
obviously warranting employment discrimination on the basis of
sex. Accordingly, the Court has stated elsewhere that "the sex
characteristic" does not reflect a woman's "ability to perform or
71
contribute to society," and that sex-based distinctions characteriz72
ing relative capabilities are "outmoded notions."
Similar
observations might be, but are not, made about disability. Neither
Congress nor the Court consistently conceptualizes disability in a
way that is constitutionally neutral.
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect" members of one sex because they are presumed to suffer from an
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
73
illegitimate. In contrast, there has been no emancipation for the
disabled similar to the post-Goesart cultural emancipation of
women that disconnects the notion of incompetence from biologi74
cal difference.
Disability discrimination law has been less
successful than sex discrimination law, in part because it imports a
conceptualization of disability from an area of law that has a purpose quite different from discrimination law.
The ADA's definition of disability is drawn directly from the Re5
habilitation Act' which, because it operates from the baseline that
assumes disabled people need rehabilitation, presumes their incompetence. Although the language of this definition is carefully
68.
Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
69.
/d.
70.
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1985).
71.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
72.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
73.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
74.
See generaUy Stein, Empluying People with Disabilities, supra note 5, at 51 (Peter David
Blanck ed., 2000); Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of
Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY LJ. 247 (1994) [hereinafter Stein, From Crippled to Disabled].

75.

29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974).
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neutral regarding their capabilities, the assumptions that pertain
to disabled people's capability in the context of the Rehabilitation
Act may affect the definition's interpretation in other contexts.
The accretion of conceptualizations of disability drawn from social
welfare law, and judicial interpretations that apply these conceptualizations to civil rights law, frustrate the expression of an evolved
understanding of disability that resembles the changes in our
thinking about women by restraining misjudgments of incompetence. This does not bode well for future interpretations of
disability rights under the ADA, whether in the Court's recent
76
opinion in University of Alabama v. Garrett, or elsewhere. If the
Court continues along its present course, operating from an assumption that disability as a classification is defined by a
characteristic of incompetence such that states are justified in excluding disabled individuals from opportunities as a valid means of
protecting their interests, then the ground for requiring equality
of opportunity for people with disabilities might be undercut.
Moreover, if the Court persists in this approach, the path to
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection for individuals with disabilities will be made so narrow, and their burden of
disadvantageous conditions imposed or endorsed by the state so
great, that opportunity will be a meaningless idea for them. Instead, the Court should, as it has in other instances, provide
direction so that an historically oppressed class, denied the opportunity to demonstrate competence and reap its rewards, can be
protected. Rather than defining the class in terms of limitation, we
suggest that the Court adopt an alternative construction consistent
with that applied to other groups of individuals with biological differences. Our proposal for how the Supreme Court can extricate
itself from the bind of retrogressive logic are set forth in Parts IV
and V. First, however, we describe the Cleburne Court's establishment of a disability classification in Part II, and Congress' inartful
response, and the subsequent results in Part III.

76.
535 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress's application of the ADA to states as
employers was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment for reasons of sovereign
immunity). The sovereign immunity issues are addressed with perspicacity in Ruth Colker,
The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653 (2000), which offers a four-part framework
for determining when Congress has abrogated state sovereignty in a constitutionally appropriate manner. More theoretical, and equally ingenious, is Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 U. MINN. L. REv. I (2000), which argues that the litmus test
for whether a given state enactment violates equal protection is "the meaning or expressive
content of the law or policy at issue." /d. at 2.
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THE DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION AND
THE CLEBURNE DOCTRINE

A clear illustration of the Supreme Court's reliance upon custom and existing welfarist statutes to shape the disability
classification as a presumption of incompetence is the framework
77
it established in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, one of
the few pre-ADA cases to succeed in deploying the Fourteenth
Amendment to the "benefit" of the disabled.
In Cleburne, a Texas town required special use zoning permits for
78
group homes for people with mental retardation, but not for
housing the same number of unrelated unimpaired people, such
as in a boarding house, apartment, fraternity house, or convales79
cent home.
Further, the special permit process required
agreement from all neighbors living within 200 feet of the pro80
posed home. Not all of the neighbors agreed to a proposal by the
Cleburne Living Center (CLC) to set up a group home for people
81
with mild to moderate cognitive limitations. Even had the permit
been approved, it was good for one year only; therefore, after adding a half bath and making other remodeling investments, the
82
CLC would have had to reapply annually.
The permit was denied, and the CLC challenged the zoning
process on Fourteenth Amendment grounds in federal district
court. Stating that the zoning ordinance was rationally related to
the state's legitimate interests, Judge Porter rejected the CLC's
83
claim in an unpublished Memorandum Opinion. On appeal to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a three judge panel disagreed,
reasoning that mental retardation constituted a quasi-suspect cate84
gory, subject to intermediate equal protection analysis. The
burden, therefore, shifted to the state to justify the necessity of the
77.
473 u.s. 432 (1985).
78.
Zoning permits were also required for people with mental illness or addictions,
and for correctional institutions. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 726 F.2d 191,
194 (5th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Cleburne Appeal].
79.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
80.
/d. at 436 n.3.
See Cleburne Appeal, 726 F.2d at 193-94.
81.
82.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at435-36.
83.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., No. CA3-80-1576-F, slip. op. (N.D.
Tex. 1984).
84.
The appellate court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the district court's
opinion. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 726 F.2d 191, 195-98 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding "that mentally retarded persons are only a 'quasi-suspect' class and that laws discriminating against the mentally retarded should be given intermediate scrutiny").
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classification which resulted in a higher barrier for unrelated people with mental retardation who desired to live in the same house
85
than for boarders, fraternity brothers, or convalescents. Upon
review of the classification, it appeared to the Fifth Circuit that the
policy had no substantial connection to an important interest of
86
the city. That is, no important interest was served by a classification that both imposed different treatment on people with mental
retardation and, in doing so, disadvantaged them in comparison
with boarders, fraternity brothers, convalescents, or similar groups
of unrelated people who did not have to have neighbors' approval
87
to share a house.
88
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Goldberg found four
major flaws with the city's zoning requirement. 89 First, the city
could have no substantial interest in responding to the private bi90
ases of the proposed group home's neighbors. This was because
irrational prejudices could not provide "legitimate bases for discrimination."91 Second, the city's claim that the classification
helped rather than harmed mentally retarded people was not
92
credible. Although the city claimed that students at the school
across the street from the proposed group home might harass its
occupants, that school already included a substantial number of
mentally retarded individuals among its students, who presumably
93
were not harassed. Third, despite the city's claim that the site's
location in a five hundred year flood plain constituted a danger to
the prospective mentally retarded residents of the group home,
the court found the possibility of a flood too remote to justify the
94
discrimination. Fourth, the city's concern with the density of occupancy of the proposed residence lacked merit. 95 Moreover, the
city never justified its apparent view that other people can live un96
der crowded conditions, but not the mentally retarded. In sum,
the four reasons given by the city to justify imposing a (prohibitively) high barrier on unrelated mentally retarded people who

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at 196, 200--02.
/d. at 200--02.
/d.
/d. at 192.
/d. at 200--03.
/d. at 202.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
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wished to share a house did not bear enough of a relation to any
substantial legislative interests.
Each of these reasons construed the barrier as being protective
of putatively weak and incompetent people whom the state had an
interest in sheltering. However, the city placed no similar barrier as
a shelter for other groups of similarly situated people. For instance, the ordinance explicitly permitted the presence of elderly
or ill people and even assigned a group of identically disabled
people-the mentally retarded students at the school-to be present in the neighborhood. This inconsistency undercut the idea
that the classification permitted the city to fulfill its obligation to
protect its weak and incompetent citizens by imposing an especially high barrier against mentally retarded people taking up
97
residence in the neighborhood.
The city, however, had also pursued a second line of argument,
both at trial and on appeal. In addition to its interest in protecting
98
retarded people, it also had an interest in protecting the public.
It claimed that the high barrier created by the special permit requirement protected the pubic against disruptions occasioned by
99
the presence of mentally retarded people. The city asserted that it
was concerned about congestion on the streets, and about fire
hazards. 100 The appellate court, however, was unconvinced by this
assertion, because the city had failed to explain why residents of
fraternity houses, apartment houses, boarding houses, and hospitals were so less likely than mentally retarded people to occasion
these evils. 101 The city had also expressed concern about the serenity of the neighborhood, and about legal responsibility for actions
102
the mentally retarded might take. Again, this assertion was not
deemed credible by the appellate court, for it was premised on the
questionable claim that well-supervised mild to moderately retarded people are more likely to create commotion and public
safety problems in a residential neighborhood than unsupervised
. b ro th ers. 103
f ratermty
In sum, these inconsistencies undercut the idea that the special
use permit requirement was necessary to enable the city to protect
its citizens against predictable disruptions. The classification
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

!d. at 201.
!d. at 200.
!d.
/d.
!d. at 201.
!d.
!d.
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explicitly designated types of unrelated people, who were as likely
as mentally retarded people to need to be sheltered or to be disruptive, as welcome in the neighborhood without special use
104
permits. Accordingly, although the holding of the district court
105
was affirmed in part on other grounds, the Fifth Circuit panel
reversed the district court's holding that the zoning ordinance was
106
constitutional. Mter denial by the Fifth Circuit of both a petition
and a suggestion for rehearing en bane, the Supreme Court
107
granted certiorari.
The Court affirmed one aspect of the appellate court's reason108
ing, while rejecting and vacating another. All of the Justices
agreed that the zoning ordinance deprived the prospective residents of the CLC group home of the equal protection of the
109
laws. This was because the record showed no way in which housing the disabled individuals in question threatened the legitimate
interests of the state in a way that uses explicitly permitted by the
110
ordinance did not. Writing for the majority, Justice White held
that "requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an
111
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded."
Thus, the Court affirmed the invalidation of the ordinance, but
only insofar as it applied to the particular disabled individuals in
112
this single case. The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
contention that the ordinance's classification scheme was quasisuspect.113 Instead, the Court proposed that, in contrast to race or
gender classifications, neither the disability classification's appearance in the city's zoning ordinance or its general use in statutes
114
was suspect.
Accordingly, the Court determined that there
should be no general presumption that legislative action employing the classification makes unconstitutional distinctions regarding
treatment, even if such legislation systematically disadvantages in115
dividuals who fall within the classification.
Although the Court explicitly limited its diagnosis that prejudice
against people with mental retardation lies behind the special
104. ld. at 201-02.
105. I d. at 203 (affirming the trial court's holding that the Johnson County Association
of Retarded Citizens lacked standing).
106. ld. at 200.
107. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
108. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985 ).
109. I d. at 435.
llO. Jd. at 448.
Ill. I d. at 450.
ll2. ld.
ll3. /d. at 439-42.
ll4. Jd. at 442-43.
ll5. Jd.
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permit requirement to "this case," the zoning requirement could
hardly have some other motivation if it continued to be applied to
raise the same high barrier against the presence of other group
homes for other unrelated mentally retarded people in the
Cleburne neighborhood. There are several reasons for looking
closely at this element of the Cleburne decision.
First, we cannot ignore the role played by what clearly appears
to be a heightened level of scrutiny in the final disposition of
Cleburne. Had the appellate court not been free to scrutinize the
presumption that differential treatment of mentally retarded people served a rational interest of the state, the city would not have
had the burden of delineating what interests the high barrier of
the special permit requirement furthered. If scrutiny had not been
applied, the fact that the connection purported to hold between
the ordinance's provisions and its purpose was illogical would not
have become evident. By denying that statutory classifications disadvantaging mentally retarded people should prompt scrutiny, the
Court made it much more difficult to test the equitability, as well as
the validity, of claims that associate their exclusion from civic and
commercial opportunity with benefits to the public interest.
Second, the Court's emphasis on the particularity of its decision
seems odd in view of its analysis of the motivation behind the
zoning ordinance restrictions. Its criticisms of the city's defense
turned on the injustice of the zoning prohibition's form, not on
the injustice of this particular application. Demonstrating the
latter involved showing that the particular individuals expected to
occupy this particular home did not deserve to fall under the ban.
But the characteristics of those individuals-whether each needed
protection or might be disruptive-were never taken to be
relevant.
Instead, the Court rejected the ordinance's classification because it appeared seriously overinclusive in relation to its
purported purposes. If the ordinance was meant to classify people
in pursuit of the state's interest in protecting the weak and incompetent, it irrationally permitted many vulnerable types of people to
be exposed to the dangers of the neighborhood. If the ordinance
was meant to classify peopie in pursuit of the state's interest in protecting the tranquility of the neighborhood, it irrationally and
explicitly excluded from the prohibition types of people more disruptive than the disabled classification it banned.
Under some circumstances, underinclusion does not constitute
inequitable treatment. Underinclusiveness may be justified when it

100
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is administratively impracticable to bring all relevant groups simi116
larly under a statute, but no such defense explained why the city
did not bring boarding houses, fraternity houses, and convalescent
homes, among other group uses explicitly permitted by the ordinance, under the special permit requirement. Underinclusiveness
may also be justified when it is politically impracticable to bring all
117
relevant groups similarly under a statute. However, as Tussman
and tenBroek remarked in 1949, the demand for equal laws is
meaningless if politically strong groups are permitted to win favor
118
in legislation. This observation remains extremely pertinent to
the status of individuals with disabilities (as well as to other catego•
) 119
nes.
As the underinclusiveness of the ordinance's classification appeared to taint it inescapably, the Court's reluctance to
acknowledge the injustice of future applications to prevent the establishment of homes for groups of mentally retarded citizens is
disturbing. Nothing in the Court's own analysis suggested that future applications of the flawed law would not be propelled by the
same irrational prejudice the Court found to be aimed at the
Cleburne Living Center. Nor does the analysis indicate how, in future attempts to establish group homes for mentally retarded
people, the city could rectify the glaring absence of legitimate state
interests in requiring special use permits.
Third, what is especially illogical about the Court's reluctance to
generalize is the impact of its approach on future litigation. Understandably, by determining that the special use permit
requirement deprived particular respondents of the equal protection of the laws, the Court could evade deciding whether the
special use provision was facially invalid in respect to the mentally
retarded and avoid making broad constitutional judgments. The
oddity is that the Court equated invalidating the existing ordinance with declaring that the city "may never insist on a special use
120
permit for a home for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone." But
to think that invalidating the ordinance had this implication was
116. See joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REv. 341,349 (1949).
117. !d. at 350-51.
118. They explained that "legislative submission to political pressure does not constitute a fair reason for failure to extend the operation of a law to those similarly situated
whom it leaves untouched." !d. at 350.
119. See Adam Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabled in the Law of Torts, 48
CATH. U. L. REv. 323 (2000); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review Article Revisited, 71
CHI. KENT L. REv. 751 (1996) (ranking the Tussman & tenBroek article as the fourteenth
most cited law review article of all time).
120. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,447 (1984).
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fallacious, for there were several ways in which a carefully tailored
ordinance could avoid the inconsistencies, and thereby the inequities, to which the Court objected.
By the time of Cleburne, it was commonplace for the Court to ex121
act careful tailoring.
However, prescribing careful tailoring
requires believing either that the presence of mentally retarded
people typically is no more burdensome on a neighborhood than
that of convalescents, transients, or fraternity boys, so that high
barriers are raised only against the sub-set of the classification who
cannot be assimilated in these respects, or mentally retarded people are typically so much more burdensome that high barriers are
needed to address burdensome traits demonstrably characteristic
of most members of the classified group.
However, the majority seemed unwilling to commit to the first
belief, refraining from declaring unequivocally that mentally retarded neighbors are generally not burdensome. On the other
hand, the majority opinion is devoid of any systematic empirical
demonstration of the truth of the alternative view, namely, that
mentally retarded neighbors are typically more burdensome than
the other categories of neighbor. Instead, the Court fell back on
22
language in the Developmental Disabilities Ad and the Education of the Handicapped Act (now called the Individuals with
123
Disabilities Education Act), to the effect that mentally retarded
people have a right to receive the educational, medical, and custodial benefits bestowed by these laws in the least restrictive setting
124
appropriate to their individual abilities.
The Court said that this language implicidy assumes the need
for some restrictions. 125 But such an inference is misleading, if not
deceptive. The statutory language cited is equally compatible with
either the need for restrictions being typical of, or instead being
126
relatively uncommon for, the classification. That is, the way the
statutory language is phrased assumes that there are some members of the classification who benefit from restrictive settings, but
nothing in the language indicates whether such individuals are
common or rare.
Thus, the keystone of the Court's reluctance to streamline constitutional protection for the mentally retarded, and by
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See generaUy LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
42 u.s.c. § 6010 (1977).
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1975).
Ckburne, 473 U.S. at444-45.
!d.
!d. at 445.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

(2d ed. 1988).
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extrapolation for all disabled people, is the prevailing characterization of the properties that constitute the group's identity. As the
Goesart Court characterized women collectively in terms of socially
undesirable dependence and disturbance, so the Cleburne Court
characterized mentally retarded people in the same terms. And as
in Goesart, the Court evoked stereotypes and appealed to questionable inferences, rather than requiring demonstrable evidence that
the classification's members are factually characterized as inherently disruptive and terribly vulnerable.
Parenthetically, to be as explicit as the Cleburne Court about particularizing a decision to a single case condemns every one situated
similarly to the plaintiffs to litigating anew. In his partial dissent,
Justice Marshall identified this problem as "the novel proposition
that 'the preferred course of adjudication' is to leave standing a
legislative Act resting on 'irrational prejudice,' thereby forcing individuals in the group discriminated against to continue to run the
127
Act's gauntlet. " This problem has become endemic to disability
discrimination law, where the same issues about access have to be
litigated vendor by vendor, program provider by program provider,
facility by facility, individually for each supplier of the same benefit
or service, and may have to be revisited whenever the management
of a facility or program changes hands. Ironically, the volume of
litigation invited by the Court's reluctance to generalize disability
discrimination findings is sometimes cited as evidence of the burdensomeness of the policy of providing equal opportunity for the
128
disabled. As we have seen, however, the problem of burgeoning
litigation does not derive from the nature of disability nor from
any special difficulties in knowing when people with disabilities
have been harmed by discrimination. The problem is attributable
to the way courts have approached the classification.
Close examination of the Cleburne Court's reasoning elucidates
the problem. The Cleburne Court held that no heightened level of
judicial review is demanded just because mentally retarded people
129
are picked out for special statutory treatment. That is because,
the Court ruled, mentally retarded people are different from other
people, and therefore states have wide latitude to treat them differently.130 The presumption that differential treatment of mentally
retarded people is warranted extends to treatment that harms
them. On this reading of equal protection, a statute or policy that
127. /d. at 473-74 (Marshali,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (intemal citations omitted).
128. See id.
129. /d. at 442-43.
130. Id. at 445.
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picks out the population of mentally retarded people for disadvantageous treatment raises no constitutional warning flag. To free
themselves of the restrictions of any such burdensome statute or
policy, individuals with mental retardation have to pursue litigation
to show that they, personally, do not merit being handicapped by
it.
In refusing to affirm the lower court's judgment that the Cleburne ordinance compromised equal protection for a classification
of people, the Court raised and resolved five issues about the classification. These may be recast as questions for which there will be
affirmative answers if the equal protection standard is met in regard to a group that is being treated differently. This means that
disadvantaging a group of citizens is presumptively justified and is
not a violation of equal protection if the answer to the following
questions about the group is "yes."
1.

2.

Is there a real difference between the group's
131
members and other people?
Does the difference affect people's ability to cope
132
with and function in the every day world?

3.

In this regard, is the difference's impact immutable?t33

4.

Is the difference rationally related to a legitimate
134
state interest?

5.

On balance, has the difference elicited more bene135
ficial than burdensome statutory treatment?

Thus, the Cleburne decision suggests a five-part test for statutory
provisions which impose more disadvantages on some groups of
citizens than on others. In respect both to cognitive impairment
and to disability generally, the. majority decision declared, the
136
answers are affirmative. Thus, in general, differential statutory
137
treatment directed at disability is permissible.
Sometimes,
however, there are instances in which the answer to the fourth
question is "no." For example, no legitimate state interest was
served by prohibiting the particular individuals with mental
retardation who were slated to live in Cleburne from doing so.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at442.
at443.
at442.
at444.
at442.
at443.
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Thus, a statute may pass the test but an application of it fail the
138
test and therefore be properly subject to judicial correction.
Consequently, the nature of the disability category effectively decrees that each allegation of disability discrimination must be
litigated independently rather than yielding to precedent. Case law
therefore cannot effectively stimulate broader social policy reform.
The Court acknowledged that people who fall within the category of mental retardation differ from each other as much or
139
more than some of them differ from non-retarded people. Nevertheless, the opinion affirmed the constitutionality of mental
140
retardation as a statutory classification. The classification is necessary, the Court said, for the government to pursue policies
designed to assist retarded people in realizing their full potential.141 Thus, there can be no presumption that legislative action
regarding retarded people is "rooted in considerations that the
142
Constitution will not tolerate." This is so even if, incidentally, the
143
action patently disadvantages some retarded individuals.
To put it in contemporary terms, the state may engage in broad
disability profiling if there is some public purpose for separating
144
out some disabled people for separate treatment. Moreover, because the facts about mental retardation and disability in general
are so complex, the Court thought legislatures were best suited to
determine how people so classified should be treated. By implication, this deference would extend to determinations of the degree
to which all members of the class may be burdened for purposes
. onIy to some. 145
re I atmg
The Cleburne doctrine (which might also be called the Goesart
doctrine because of its similar reasoning) calls out for critical
analysis. Martha Minow offers an instructive commentary by articulating several different accounts of the values at issue in Justice
White's majority opinion and the separate opinions ofjustices Stevens146 and Marshall. 147 While we admire the sweep of her
approach, we think it may overlook or obscure a central disagree138. /d. at446.
139. /d. at442.
140. See id. at 442-46.
141. /d. at445.
142. /d. at446.
143. See id.
144. See id. However, in Garrett the Court appears to have changed its position on the
deference due to the legislative process. See Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356, 376 (2001)
(Breyer,]., dissenting).
145. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443.
146. /d. at 451 (concurring, joined by the Chiefjustice).
147. /d. at 455 (concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan, J., and
Blackmun,J.).
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ment over the logic of validly constructing constitutionally protected classes.
According to Min ow, three different views of the matter of classi148
fication emerge from the Cleburne discussion. Writing for the
Court, Justice White took mentally retarded people to be a class of
naturally inferior people, who "have a reduced ability to cope with
149
and function in the everyday world." As a group, he concluded,
150
they are "different, immutably so, in relevant respects." This difference is supposed to establish that a state's interest in providing
151
for the retarded is legitimate. That there is legislation "singling
out the retarded for special treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others ....
[G]overnmental consideration of those differences in the vast ma152
jority of situations is not only legitimate but also desirable." In
sum, the Court validated the classification because of its usefulness
153
in "a wide range of decisions."
To Minow, this means assuming that society is divided into two
classes, normal and abnormal people, and that mentally retarded
people are more like each other than like the rest of the community.154 In the majority's view, people with mental retardation are
different, and their difference warrants differential treatment
155
whether or not they are disadvantaged by it. On the other hand,
Justice Stevens emphasized the similarity of mentally retarded
people to the rest of the community. In his view, their similarity
warranted equal treatment unless "[a]n impartial lawmakerindeed, even a member of a class of persons defined as mentally
retarded-could rationally vote in favor of a law" that provides for
156
differential treatment. Far from being presumed to be justified,
statutory provisions that limit the opportunities of mentally retarded people must be perceived as rationally related not only to
an impartial state interest but also to the interests of those who
through its action will be deprived. For instance, Justice Stevens
148. See Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the MentaUy Retarded, Equal Protection and the Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 111,
120-31 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, When Difference Has Its Home]. See also MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 106 (1990)
[hereinafter MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE].
149. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at442.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 444.
153. I d. at 446.
154. See MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 106.
155. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
156. Id. at 454 (Stevens,]., concurring).
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thought that both an impartial legislator and a self-interested retarded person could support preventing retarded people from
. h azard ous eqmpment.
.
157
operaung
Minow objected that this way of thinking abstracts from and
thereby disregards retarded people's real differences by assimilating them to the "rational man" standard that forms a community
158
norm. It is a mistake, however, to equate mental retardation with
irrationality. As even Justice White agreed, the classification ranges
over "those whose disability is not immediately evident to those
159
who must be constantly cared for. " Further, the record established that nearly ninety percent of the individuals falling into the
classification are only mildly retarded, and another six percent are
160
moderately retarded.
Being rational requires no great intelligence, especially when
one is being rational about what is in one's self-interest. When
Sandra jensen, a woman with Down Syndrome, fought for a place
on a heart transplant list, she not only understood that securing a
new heart was in her rational self-interest but argued compellingly
161
that she deserved this opportunity. She argued with reference to
the similarity of her situation to that of the nonretarded patients
162
admitted without controversy to the list. She used, in other
163
words, a definitively rational form of argument. When, as they
often do, people with mild mental retardation object to being
treated less favorably than nondisabled people, they are appealing
to consistency and thereby demonstrating their grasp of a basic
tenet of rationality.
Let us assume that retarded people as a class are different in
some way from nonretarded people, for there is no controversy
that the classification has some reference. Nevertheless, there is
great controversy over the boundaries of the classification, as well
as where, within the classification, individuals best fit. In Cleburne,
the Court initially spoke as if the boundary is "a reduced ability to
157. /d.
158. Review MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 115, 341-49,
bearing in mind her treatment of In re PhiUip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. App. 3d. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980), in which a trial judge used a similar device to introduce the
"standpoint" of a mentally retarded fourteen year old.
159. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
160. /d. at 442 n.9.
161. See Celeste Fremon, "We Do Not Feel that Patients with Dawn Syndrome are Appropriate
Candidates for Heart-Lung Transplantation": These Words were a Death Sentence for Sandra Jensen,
and That, She Decided, just Wasn't Going to Happen, L.A. TIMES, April14, 1996, at 18.
162. See id.
163. Jensen succeeded, becoming "the first seriously retarded person in the United
States to receive a major transplant." New Heart for Retarded Woman, N.Y. TIMEs, January 24,
1996, at A16.
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cope with and function in the everyday world." 164 But this characterization is as apdy applied to absent-minded professors,
improvident artists, and unworldly religieuses as to mentally retarded people. All the latter can behave so incompetently and
disruptively as to be burdensome, but all enjoy the scope of the
equal protection standard that is denied to mentally retarded people.
Another formulation is "limitations on general ability to meet
the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence,
and social responsibility expected for an individual's age level and
165
cultural group." Surely this characterization is much too vague. It
is the further idea that such limitations are immutable that seemed
to sway the Court. But this is also an unclear attribution, for new
educational techniques defeat claims about the immutability of
some retarded people's limitations. A nineteen-year-old with Down
Syndrome who is a high school graduate, enrolled in a community
college, and earning a wage surely falls within societal standards.
In her case, immutability pertains to the biological condition of
her trisomy, not to her social limitations. Clearly, it is to her alterable social limitations, not to her immutable chromosomal trisomy,
that any rational state interests pertain.
The Court also proposed that "the distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those who are
mentally retarded demonstrates that they have unique problems .
166
• • •"
This reasoning is, of course, circular, and it does not demonstrate that these problems arise from immutable deficits. In
asserting that "legislation ... singling out the retarded for special
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the
167
retarded and others," the Court neglected to note the extent to
which these differences are reified when legislatures or other social spokespersons single them out for special comment or
treatment. Thus, even currently real social differences between
retarded and nonretarded people may be mutable, depending on
how cultural practice and habit address them. In this regard, Justice Marshall referred in his partial dissent to the history in which
mentally retarded people were left to their own devices and were
expected to be basically self-sufficient, until the later nineteenth
164. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
165. !d. at 442 n.9 (citing the brief submitted by the American Association on Mental
Deficiency in order to define "deficits in adaptive behavior.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
166. !d. at 443.
167. !d. at 444.
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century, when "[a] regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled,
and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow" and
"[m]assive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the re168
tarded for life." The results of this history continue to influence
the extent to which mentally retarded people develop selfsufficiency today.
Marshall emphasized that a population's history contributes to
the differences that currently are characteristics of the group. On
Minow's interpretation, Marshall's account verges on a "socialrelations" approach in which differences between groups are ac169
knowledged and respected. The meaning of such differences is
always contextualized. Their import must be assessed with regard
to power differentials and other relationships that exist between
170
the groups.
Attributions of difference that fuel exclusionary
practices are condemned as self-serving mechanisms for preserving
the power of dominant classes. There is, instead, an emphasis on
interconnectedness and on the multiplicity of avenues for contrib171
uting to the collective good. The social-relations approach calls
for reform of marginalizing practices so as to cultivate the freedom
of diverse kinds of people to participate in both the rewards and
172
the responsibilities of social interaction.
In sum, the m~ority of the Court presumed that retarded people's differences, and by extrapolation the differences from
species-typical biology displayed by other persons with disabilities,
173
were legitimate ·proxies for sociallimitations. Unless proven oth168. !d. at 462 (Marshall,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. MIN OW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 119.
170. !d. at 211-24.
171. !d.
172. !d. at 224.
173. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356 (2001) makes explicit the
Court's intention to extrapolate across disabilities when invoking the Cleburne doctrine. In
Garrett, the Court invoked the Cleburne doctrine to strip away much of the protection against
disability discrimination the ADA had granted to state employees. Garrett, 535 U.S. at 365-66. Following Cleburne, the Court shifted the burden to disabled plaintiffs to establish that
no state interest in excluding the disabled from the workplace was conceivable. !d. Further,
the Court's description of disabled people as needing "allowances" and "special
accommodations," terms that do not appear in the text of the ADA, is indicative of a
presumption that disabled people are less competent than nondisabled people. See id. at
964. By characterizing disabled people as being in need of special treatment, the Court
stipulated that refusing to include them in the workplace was prima facie rational, rather
than considering this to be an open question awaiting empirical determination. Further, the
Court's stipulation that "hiring employees able to use existing facilities," rather than
qualified disabled employees who cannot, id. at 966. is rational underlines the great
disparity between the treatment of disabled people and women. It is inconceivable that an
employer's overt refusal to hire qualified women simply because the existing facilities have
urinals would be upheld as nondiscriminatory.
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erwise on a case by case basis, these differences are rationally related to interests of the state. Stevens' concurrence presumed
exactly the opposite, that disabled people's differences are not
relevant, unless proven otherwise. Marshall's partial dissent took
the history of oppression of disabled people to be a lens that inexorably distorted assessments of their differences.
As illuminating as Marshall's analysis is, it addressed the
assessment rather than the construction of the relevant class. The
analysis assumed that the disabled are different but did not ask
which of their differences are relevantly and responsibly
referenced as traits definitive of the class. People can differ from
one another biologically or socially. We already have seen that
biological properties, such as a certain level of intelligence or the
absence or impairment of a corporeal component, are essential to
the disability classification but are not socially relevant unless they
are linked to limitations that render individuals burdensomely
dependent or disruptive. Essential biological properties may be
shared by all who are subject to the classification, but not all the
classification's members may be socially burdensome or disruptive.
Only a minority may be so.
A similar clarification applies to the sex classification at issue in
Goesart. To be sure, certain biological properties are essential to
the female sex classification, but any link these might have to dependency and disruptiveness is a mere contingency. The Goesart
Court stipulated that dependency and disruptiveness are inexorably linked to being female by invoking an essentialist definition,
but there is no better witness to the tenuousness of the link the
Goesart Court took to be unquestionable than the Cleburne Court,
which insisted that statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded
174
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.
It took no more than three decades for beliefs that were patent
to the Goesart Court to seem outmoded to the Cleburne Court.
There are two matters on which these Courts do agree: that there
is a difference between women and men, and that for a sub-set of
women, this difference is associated with dependent or disturbing
behavior. Yet for the Goesart Court, the sub-set that is saliently dependent or disturbing is representative of the classification, while
for the Cleburne Court thinking of this same sub-set of women as
representative of the female classification is retrogressive thinking.

174.

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
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At the heart of the Cleburne decision lie questions of fact and
justice about the latitude with which the states' interests in constraining or excluding a sub-set of a classification may be served
by activities that impose special burdens on, and reduce opportunity for, the entire membership of the class. The classification
employed by the Cleburne ordinance was underinclusive because
it did not burden many groups touched by its rationale, and it
was also overinclusive because some, and perhaps the majority, of
individuals subjected to its burden are not touched by its rationale. Let us now assume not only that retarded people are
different from nonretarded people in some respects, but that a
sub-set of the classification differs precisely in the respect of being
strongly linked by empirical evidence to dependency and disturbance. Even so, as Tussman and tenBroek pointed out,
overinclusiveness is a more egregious violation of the standards of
reasonable classification than underinclusiveness because "overinclusive classifications reach out to the innocent bystander, the
175
hapless victim of circumstance or association." To the Cleburne
Court both the underinclusiveness and the overinclusiveness of the
sex classification embraced by the Goesart Court reflected "outmoded notions" that violated standards of reasonable
classification. 176 To the Cleburne Court, the under-inclusiveness of
the disability classification violated reasonable classification stan177
dards, but its overinclusiveness did not.
What we have seen so far is that the Cleburne Court's confidence
in affirmatively answering the second, third and fourth questions
of its doctrinal test is warranted only if an overinclusive classification is drawn. This point should make us wary of embracing the
Cleburne doctrine without careful examination of its inherent logic,
for the point suggests that the doctrine does not promote constitutionally neutral classification. Further, giving an affirmative answer
to question five, regarding the balance of beneficial overburdensome statutory treatment, is also problematic. An affirmative answer may be true only of a minority of the membership of a
classification, the relatively small number who are the beneficiaries
of rehabilitative or other special services. To better understand the
persistence of overinclusiveness in constructing the disability classification, we now turn to a description of Congress's inartful
attempt to rebut the Cleburne doctrine, and the results that followed.
175.
176.
177.

Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 116, at 351.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
/d. at 442-46.
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CLEBuRNE DocTRINE

ANDITSAFrERMATH

A. The Americans With Disabilities Act

Congress passed the ADA primarily because it saw the systematically inferior treatment of disabled people as rising to the level of
unconstitutional discrimination. To ameliorate this problem, it attempted to rebut the Supreme Court's Cleburne doctrine, which
denied the disabled constitutional scrutiny, by creating a heightened level of statutory scrutiny. Nevertheless, Congress was inartful
in drafting the ADA. The problem lies in the wholesale incorporation of the definition of disability from the Rehabilitation Act.
Although the definition itself, which focused on "substantial limitations of major life activities," was facially neutral regarding the
capability of the protected class to perform social functions, it carried with it culturally retrogressive notions about the disabled.
Thus, despite including language regarding its clear intention to
rebut the Cleburne framework in its findings, Congress did not succeed in blocking this retrogressive conceptualization of disability.
In fact, the Cleburne doctrine continues to control post-ADA Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, in drafting the ADA,
Congress explicitly challenged at least three claims made by the
Cleburne Court.
First, the Cleburne Court saw legislative efforts to apply the dis178
ability category as being mainly for positive purposes. Because
people classified as mentally retarded enjoyed the purported benefits of this classification, the Cleburne Court declared that these
179
individuals must be politically powerful. By implication, then,
people classified as eligible for various kinds of disability programs
180
are to be considered politically powerful as long as legislation
181
purported to be beneficial is specially targeted at them.
178. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1984).
179. Id. at 445.
180. But see Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361 ( 1996).
181. This implication is strongly rebutted by the work of two philosophers writing on
the "politics of resentment." See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY (1994); WILLIAM CON·
NOLLY, IDENTITY /DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (1991).
Within the context of the ADA, the subject of backlash was addressed in a symposium published by the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, wherein the introduction offers a
superlative overview. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword: Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1 (2000).
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In contrast, Congress addressed this matter empirically. The
findings of an independent nationwide poll of Americans with disabilities conducted in 1986 by Louis Harris and Associates showed
183
the disempowerment of the disabled. The lCD Survey found that
two-thirds of working age individuals with disabilities are unem184
ployed, while two-thirds of non-working disabled individuals want
185
to work.
Having amassed evidence that controverted the Cleburne Court's
presumption, Congress declared in its findings that historically the
disability category has been invoked for the purpose of denying
186
liberties and opportunity to people assigned to it. Testimony
gathered during its hearings also led Congress to find, explicitly,
that people with disabilities have been "relegated to a position of
187
political powerlessness in our society." This last phrase, as well as
those surrounding it in Congress's legislative finding, were specifi182. For a thorough overview by one of the ADA's drafters, see Robert L. Burgdorf Jr.,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights
Statute 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991). A very good journalistic account of the politics behind the passage of the ADA is josEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES FoRGING A NEw CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993). See also Stein, From Crippkd to
Disabled, supra note 74.
183. LOUIS HARRIS & AsSOCIATES, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE DISABLED
SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM
(1986) [hereinafter lCD SuRVEY]. The results of this poll were often cited by organizations
concerned with the status of individuals with disabilities. See, e.g., NATIONAL CouNCIL ON
DISABILITY, IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY OF THE 1986 HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES (1988); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD
OF INDEPENDENCE (1988). In addition, the results of the survey were summarized to Congress by the President of Louis Harris and Associates during hearings on the ADA See
Guaranteed Job Dppurtunity Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 777 Before the Subcomm. On Employment
and Productivity and Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Comm. On Labor and Human Resources,
101st Cong. S. Hrg. 166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor) (quoted inS. REP.
No. 101-116, at 8 (1989); also quoted in H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 31 (1990)). See also H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990).
184. See lCD SuRVEY, supra note 183, at 47.
185. /d. at 50-51.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (5)(1994) (stating that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination," including those arising from
"overprotective rules and policies."). See generaUy RICHARD K ScoTCH, FROM Goon WILL TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001); Drimmer, supra
note 12.
187. 42 U.S.C. at§ 12101 (a)(7). Congress's difference with the Cleburne Court may be a
matter of having different reference classes rather than outright denial. The Cleburne Court
looked to the evidence of public programs lobbied for primarily by interest groups of families of people with certain kinds of impairments and the professionals who work with them.
Such groups, which sometimes but not always are guided by disabled people themselves,
continue to be active. The very broad-based organization of disabled people to pursue civil
rights protection, however, was a unique occurrence. This action cannot itself be evidence
of the political power of disabled people. It would be circular to argue so, for then any effective political effort to protect a group's civil rights could be undermined on the ground
that its imminent success demonstrates its disproportionateness.
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cally taken from Supreme Court decisions approving equal protec188
tion classifications. The use of this specific language in the ADA,
responding to what the Supreme Court, circa 1990, required for
heightened constitutional scrutiny, demonstrates that Congress was
consciously attempting to rebut the Cleburne framework.
Moreover, Congress cited the "continuing existence of unfair
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice" denying disabled
189
people equal opportunities in society, noting that this disparate
treatment persisted in areas which states sponsor or control, including education, transportation, access to public services, and
190
voting. Again, the fact that Congress specifically cited the existence of this type of social exclusion evidences its intention to
empower disabled people through the ADA by bestowing upon
them a heightened level of statutory scrutiny. To counteract this
phenomenon, Congress explicitly defined "public entity" in Title II
of the ADA to mean "any State or local government," including all
191
their departments and agencies.
The continuation through to the present of state-legislated policies was recently documented by Justice Breyer's eloquent dissent
192
in Garrett. Reviewing the record of legislative hearings and the
findings presented therein, Justice Breyer concluded that "Congress compiled a vast legislative record" which documented
extensive and "powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment" of
193
the disabled that "implicate[d] state governments." To support
this argument, Justice Breyer appended to his opinion an extensive
catalogue of state-sponsored enactments which violated the rights
194
of the disabled. Also notable is that in spite of Congress's having
specifically directed that people with disabilities not be prevented
from exercising their franchises, as many as one-third of the coun195
try's 120,000 polling places nationwide still lack full access.
Second, the ADA's statement of purpose proclaims a categorical
antidiscrimination directive by the federal government on behalf
of disabled Americans. Specifically, Congress declared that the
statute's main purpose was "to provide a clear and comprehensive
188. See Burgdorf, supra note 182, at 436. _
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
190. !d.§ 12101 (a)(3).
191. !d.§ 12131(1)(A)-(B).
192. SeeUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356,376 (2001) (Breyer,]., dissenting).
193. !d. at 969-70.
194. !d. at 977-93.
195. As a result, in 1996 only thirty percent of voting-age disabled people cast ballots,
compared to forty-nine percent of the nondisabled voting population. See David Cracy, Disabled Voters Roused to Action, AP NAT'L WIRE, Nov. 2, 2000.
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national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against in196
dividuals with disabilities,"
by promulgating "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing" both individual and
197
systematic forms of discrimination. Congress also stated that part
of its purpose in promulgating the legislation was "to ensure that
the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan198
dards" established by the ADA. This language indicates that
policies and practices are to be enjoined if they are found to invite
or facilitate discriminatory actions. Cleburne excepted any state
policies or practices that could be rationally related to a state interest and required that relief be sought application by
199
application, and therefore with very little potential for stimulating social transformation. In a contrasting response, Congress,
through passage of the ADA, said it would bring about sweeping
200
changes in social policy. Hence, Congress's overt intention in
promulgating the statute was to raise the level at which social exclusions of the disabled would be examined by courts in the
future.
Third, the Cleburne test presumes that disability immutably diminishes people's capacity to cope with and function in the
201
world. On the other hand, the ADA is premised on the belief
that the repercussions of disability often are mutable. 202 In many
instances, they are mitigated or thoroughly relieved when the social environment accommodates physical and cognitive
203
difference. Here again, legislative history shows that Congress
was presented with a prodigious body of evidence-case after case
in which being disabled resulted in capable citizens being denied
204
opportunity and excluded from social participation.
205
The more compelling anecdotal evidence included testimony:
by a wheelchair-using future under-secretary of the Department of
Education who was removed from an auction house for being
196. 42 u.s.c. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
197. /d.§ 12101(b)(2).
198. /d.§ 12101(b)(3).
199. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 474 (1985) (Marshall,
]., concurring).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
201. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
202. See generaUy SILVERS, supra note 18.
203. Ironically, the Supreme Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and Alhertson can be interpreted to mean that for ADA purposes, the use of mitigating measures by disabled
people transmogrifies them into "normal," non-disabled people bereft of antidiscrimination
protection. See generaUy Soifer, supra note 48.
204. See generaUy Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393 (1991).
205. Compiled inS. REP. No. 101-116 (1989).
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206
deemed "disgusting to look at;" about individuals with Down
Syndrome who were banned from a zoo because of the keeper's
207
fear they would frighten the chimpanzees; that an academically
competitive and nondisruptive child was barred from attending
public school because of a teacher's allegation that his physical ap208
pearance "produced a nauseating effect" upon classmates; and of
the denial of a job to a competent arthritic woman by a college
because of its trustees' belief that "normal students shouldn't see
209
her. " As a result of its extensive hearings, Congress found, as an
empirical matter, that disabled individuals have been subject to
many forms of discrimination, "including outright intentional exclusion"210 as well as more invidious forms of exclusion arising
through policies, practices, and "exclusionary qualification standards and criteria." 211
In sum, the fact that Congress compiled extensive evidence of
discrimination, endorsed remedies to ameliorate this condition in
the form of an antidiscrimination law, and specifically utilized language in its Findings which reflects 1990 constitutional theory, all
evidence its intention that courts utilize a raised level of scrutiny
when examining the exclusion of the disabled.

B. The judicial Response to the ADA

Despite the vast evidence compiled by Congress in support of
the ADA's passage, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it
questionable whether any factual demonstrations of the competence of people with disabilities could ever incline this Court to
accept the beliefs that frame the ADA. 212
206. ld. at 6-7 (testimony ofJudith Heumann).
207. ld. at 7.
208. ld.
209. ld. at 7-8.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994).
211. ld.
212. See Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 535 U.S. 356, 360-61 (2001). Moreover, the issue of
legislative history and intent being rendered impotent goes beyond the field of disability
law. In an insightful article entitled "Dissing Congress," Professors Colker and Brudney
argue that during the 1990s (a period coinciding with the post-ADA cases) the Court developed a dual methodology for assessing the constitutional adequacy of federal
antidiscrimination laws that is almost impossible for Congressional enactments to withstand.
See Colker & Brudney, Dissing Congress, supra note 27, at 85 (2001 ). They demonstrate, in the
context of age discrimination, how the Court has developed a "phantom legislative history
approach." !d. Under this framework, "the Court expresses interest in considering legislative history when assessing constitutionality, but then establishes and applies a legal standard

116

University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform

[VoL. 35:1&2

Here we may recall that while acknowledging the "vast changes
213
in the social and legal position of women," the Goesart Court
held that "the fact that women may now have achieved the virtues
that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge
in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the states
214
from drawing a sharp line between the sexes." The Cleburne
Court permitted benefits and burdens to be distributed differently
to disabled and nondisabled persons because of the presumed dif215
ference in their capabilities. In the spirit of Goesart, the current
Court may continue to draw sharp lines between species-typical
and biologically anomalous people regardless of technological,
social, and legal changes that permit disabled people to achieve
216
the capabilities long practiced by the nondisabled. Much effort
by the current Court has gone into pressing the disability category
into conformity with the framework on which Cleburne was built. By
disregarding Congress's attempt to throw off the Cleburne framework, the Court may have disabled Congress. For it may be
impossible to legislate remedies for disability discrimination without breaking out of Cleburne's straitjacket of reasoning.
The construction of the Cleburne Court's reasoning places on the
conceptualization of disability is guided by the judicial emphasis
on the centrality of being dysfunctional to being disabled. This is
the message of five of the six cases the Court has heard since passage of the ADA. (The sixth, Olmstead, centered on individuals who
are mentally retarded and in extended medical dependence, and
who therefore conformed ideally to the Cleburne template.) In
Bragdon, decided in 1998, perceived limitation of reproductive
217
function qualified an individual as disabled. As we showed in Part
I, the source of this limitation lay in social convention rather than
biological fact. The following year, plaintiff Cleveland was deemed
to have ADA protection in retaining employment, even though she
for review that even a detailed legislative record could not possibly satisfY." !d. at 85--86. This
is precisely the concern voiced by Justice Breyer in his Garrett dissent. See Garrett, 535 U.S. at
376-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Even when Congress established a detailed and lengthy record of state-sponsored discrimination against the disabled, the current Court's majority was
entrenched so deeply in retrogressive methodology that it categorized the historical evidence as failing to prove systematic discrimination by the states. See id. at 960.
213. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,465-66 (1948).
214. !d. at 466.
215. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,444 (1985).
216. The current Court, as evidenced through the 1999 trio of holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson s discussed infra in Part III, appears to deal with advances in
pharmaceutical and prosthetic technology by holding that disabled people who use them
may fall beyond disability discrimination protection because their impairments are mitigated.
217. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998).
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had exercised a statutory entitlement to Social Security Disability
218
Insurance. However, the burden shifted to her to show that with
reasonable accommodation she could overcome the crucial aspects of the employment-related dysfunction on which her SSDI
219
application was based. Thus, the Court preserved the Cleburne
principle, where assignment to the disability classification carries a
presumption of incompetence, and continued to expect individuals so classified to prove themselves exceptions to the presumption
in order to gain access to the normal opportunity range. In the
220
221
same year as Cleveland, plaintiffs Sutton, Kirkingburg and Murphy222 were all disqualified from protection against disability
discrimination because in the eyes of the Court, the limitations
223
occasioned by their impairments could be overcome.
A curious digression may give the influence of Cleburne over
Sutton away. Although Sutton concerns the classification of myopia
as a disability, the Court goes out of its way to illustrate its point by
224
discussing diabetes.
Diabetes also should not be viewed
categorically as a disability, according to the opinion, despite the
clarity with which the ADA's legislative history shows Congress's
intent to address disability discrimination against people with
225
diabetes. Because diabetes may or may not affect an individual's
performance of major life activities, the Court declared it
impermissible to treat people with this condition as prima facie
226
falling into the disability category. Instead, how each citizen with
diabetes handles her condition must be assessed individually,
application by application, in order to learn whether that
227
particular citizen is protected against disability discrimination.
Why digress to disassociate the diagnosis of diabetes from disability? There are two important ways in which diabetes differs
from mental retardation, which is the paradigm for the Cleburne
doctrine. First, mental retardation more commonly diminishes
people's ability to cope with and function in the every day world

218. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
219. See id. at 798.
220. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
221. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
222. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
223. The myth of a disabled person "overcoming" his or her disability, and the catch-22
that ensues, is discussed in Stein, From Crippled to Disabled, supra note 74.
224. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
225. /d. at 501.
226. /d. at478.
227. /d. at 483.
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than does diabetes. This was not always so, but has become the
case because contemporary medications directly mitigate some of
229
diabetes' effects.
Suppose now that Congress' explicit intention to include people
with diabetes in the disability category were to be honored. In
other words, for purposes of the ADA, biologically anomalous but
mainly functional individuals who experience differential treatment by the state primarily in respect to being blocked from
pursuing opportunities available to biologically species-typical and
fully functional people, are included in the disability category. If
the disability category is understood in this way, there is an empirical question about whether it is populated mostly by individuals
who are mainly dysfunctional because of their biological anomalies, and who experience differential treatment by the state
primarily in regard to receiving protective benefits not available to
species-typical people.
In the absence of facts establishing that this is so, there is reason
to agree with the conclusion voiced by the Ninth Circuit in Kirkingburg, namely, that in order to prevent unconstitutional behavior,
the ADA's provisions may prohibit some state conduct that might
230
pass muster under rational basis review. This is because what is
perceived as the rational treatment of any class of diverse individuals is affected by which among them is taken to be paradigmatic of
the class. Thus treatment that might be rational in respect to a
small sub-set of biologically anomalous people could be unconstitutionally burdensome when applied broadly by virtue of people's
biological anomalies.
Minow observed that the play of categorization in law and public policy often fails to distinguish speculative from actual
231
ramifications of biological variation. Anthony Amsterdam and
Jerome Bruner explain why this is so: legal categories function to
regulate risk by sorting people into those who have an affinity
within the system and those who threaten it. 232 The more prominently a classification is thought of in terms of members' potential
228. See generaUy AMERICAN AssOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (1992). On the intersection
of mental retardation and the ADA, see PETER DAVID BLANCK, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE EMERGING WORKFORCE: EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION (1998).
229. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 501 (suggesting that the effects of diabetes can be controlled).
230. Kirkingburg v. Albertson's Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
231. See MIN OW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 148, at 174.
232. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & jEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw: How COURTS
RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND THE
LAW AND OURSELVES 25 (2000).
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for dependency or disruptiveness, the more important the interest
233
of the state in treating the class dissimilarly is presumed to be.
Such differential policies will be understood as strategies for addressing the moral or social problems attributed to the class.
Congress defined the disabled as that group of people who have
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
234
more of the major life activities of such individual[s]," those who
235
have a history of such impairment, or are regarded as having
236
them. This language references limitation of major life activities,·
which means constriction of one of the principal processes or performances of life. 237 The language does not, however, directly
reference the capabilities of those individuals to execute social
functions, such as work. IndiViduals limited in respect to a particular major life activity may execute social functions associated with
that activity through performances of other major life activities.
For example, people who are substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing can obtain information from texts by touching
(Brailled text) or hearing (voice output of electronic text).
The tripartite definition was imported from the Rehabilitation
238
Act to the ADA. In the context of the Rehabilitation Act, limitation of major life processes or performances may be associated
prominently with the dependency that providing the special benefit of rehabilitation services is supposed to overcome. Beyond the
context of the Rehabilitation Act, however, this association is not
necessarily prominent. In fact, the ADA's legislative findings demonstrate clearly that Congress differentiated between being
substantially limited in a major life activity (for example, being un239
able to walk) and being competent so far as being capable of
240
performing social functions (working, for instance). That Congress so distinguished between the two concepts of function and
competence in promulgating the ADA, a discernment attributed to
241
it by two of the ADA's drafters, is demonstrated by the statute's
233. /d.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
235. /d.§ 12102(2)(8).
236. !d.§ 12102(2) (C).
237. !d.
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 200-10.
240. See generaUy Amartya Sen, Editarial: Human Capital and Human Capability, 25 WORLD
DEv. 1959 (1997) (explaining a technical term created by Amartya Sen for a function that
can be achieved through a variety of alternative activities. Thus, the function of mobilizing
can be competently achieved either through walking or by wheeling).
241. Robert-L. BurgdorfJr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of
a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413,447-62 (1991). See also
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own terms. Mter delineating disability through the terms borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act, Title I extended its coverage to
any qualified individual with disabilities, which it defined as those
individuals who either with or without reasonable accommoda242
tions can perform the essential functions of a given job. This last
section from the ADA clearly demonstrates that Congress presumed certain disabled people were, either with or without
accommodations, competent to work (and by extension, engage in
other social functions). It could not then, in any sense, have
equated the functional limitations which it delineated as defining
the class with the characteristic of incompetence. So, contrary to
the Cleburne Court, beyond the context of the Rehabilitation Act
and statutes conferring similar special benefits, we may not presume that differences in abilities to perform life activities entail
differences in abilities to cope with the world.
Congress imported the Rehabilitation Act's three-prong definition of disability as a matter of political expediency. Regulations
issued in 1977 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)) specifically enumerated who was considered "handi243
capped" under the Rehabilitation Act's definition. The extensive
HEW regulations were utilized, fairly uniformly, by both agencies
244
and courts enforcing the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, although legislators excluded several controversial conditions from ADA
245
coverage, incorporating the terms of the Rehabilitation Act was
viewed as a quick and convenient way to delineate which individu246
als would come under the statute's auspices. Adopting the terms
and usage from the Rehabilitation Act was not, however, an endorsement of context, especially as it relates to the capabilities of
the protected class. Thus, although social custom may view the
terms as reflecting the competence of the protected group, Con.,
gress did not intend to endorse that custom when utilizing
otherwise neutral language from the different context of the Rehabilitation Act.
Along with the wholesale importation of the definition of
disability from the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA, Congress also
Arlene Mayerson, Title 1-Empluyment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 U;MP.
L. REv. 499 (1991).
242. See supra text at notes 233-36.
243. 45 C.F.R § 84.3 (2000).
244. See Chai R Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, 7 LAB.
LAW]. 11, 12-13 (1991). Feldblum was actively involved in negotiating aspects of the ADA.
245. Among the excluded groups were homosexuals, transvestites, pedophiles, kleptomaniacs, and exhibitionists. A comprehensive list is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994).
246. See generaUy Burgdorf, supra note 182.
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imported that statute's formulation of what comprises disabilitybased discrimination. This was neither an obvious, nor an
unopposed choice for Congress to have made. Dissatisfied with the
scope of pre-ADA civil rights statutes affecting the disabled, 247
248
249
academic commentators and disability rights groups advocated
amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act through addition of the term
"handicapped" since the mid-1980s. The result of this emendation
would have been protections against discrimination paralleling
that of other groups, in other words, "on the basis of' having a
disability, a formula utilized in some other disability-related
antidiscrimination statutes250 This formulation would also have
mirrored that applied to people covered by the Civil Rights Act of
251
1964 (Title VII). By contrast, the Rehabilitation Act (as well as a
252
handful of statutes modeled after it)
requires that those
individuals defined as having a disability must also satisfy a second
requirement, that they be "qualified" individuals with disabilities. 253
The Rehabilitation Act formulation requiring disabled plaintiffs to
prove their qualifications was incorporated into Titles I and II of
the ADA.
The implication of this standard was substantial for judicial
methodological (as well as practical pleading) purposes because, as
247. See Janet Flaccus, Discrimination Legislation for the Handicapped: Much Ferment and
Erosion of Coverage, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 81 (1986);Janet Flaccus, Handicap Discrimination Legislation: With Such Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State Legislation Be of Any Help?,
40 ARK. L. REv. 261 (1986).
248. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf & Christopher Bell, Eliminating Discrimination Against
Physically and Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DisABILITY L. REP. 64 (1984).
249. Most prominent was the National Council on the Handicapped's strong opposition to the Rehabilitation Act model: "Proof of class membership is not required under
other types of nondiscrimination laws, and statutes guaranteeing equal opportunity for
persons with disabilities need not have such a requirement either." NATIONAL CouNCIL ON
THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 183, at A-25.
250. Examples include the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability for
the purposes of Foreign Service employment, 22 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(1) (1988); participation
in any pursuit funded under the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, 15
U.S.C.§ 3151(a) (1988); activities of labor organizations, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(4) (1988); and
the sale or rental of housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (1)-(2) (1988).
251. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994)).
252. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1374(1) (1988) (prohibiting air carriers from discriminating
against qualified individuals with handicaps).
253. !d. A clear demonstration of this standard, as well as the circularity of its reasoning, can be seen in Southeastern Cmty. Colt. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 397 (1979), where the
Court held that because a student with a profound hearing disorder could not be reasonably accommodated in a clinical nurse training program, adverse actions taken against her
could not be construed as disability discrimination because she was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" under the terms of the statute.
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a result of the inclusion of this requirement, disabled individuals
have in practice been under a greater burden of beginning their
prima facie assertions of Title I and II civil rights claims than have
Title VII litigants.
Both ADA claimants, because of the "qualified disabled" language, and Title VII claimants, due to the Supreme Court's
254
decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, are required under
their respective burdens of production to plead prima facie cases
of discrimination in order to avoid summary judgment. Nevertheless, while the Court held in McDonnell Douglas that the level
required of women plaintiffs be "minimal," the parallel burden has
in practice been much higher among ADA Title I plaintiffs.
Empirical studies by Ruth Colker substantiate this point. Following a report by the American Bar Association that employers
prevailed in over ninety-two percent of Title I cases over the period
255
1992-97, Colker created her own database of all Title I claims
256
filed over this period. Colker concluded that under the ADA,
"[c]ourts are abusing the summary judgment device" both by refusing to send normative factual questions to juries as well as by
"creating an impossibly high threshold of proof for defeating"
summary judgment claims, including the burden of proving prima
257
facie competence. Colker has also examined appellate decisions,
and found that the success rate of ADA appellants also pales in
258
comparison to Title VII appellants.
As an example, if a woman with a doctorate in nuclear physics
sues an employer after being denied a job as a nuclear physicist,
the initial presumption under Title VII which this employer may or
may not rebut is that she was discriminated against because of her
259
sex. By contrast, as has been empirically proven, the same job
254. 411 u.s. 792 (1973).
255. Study Finds Emplayers Win Most ADA Title I judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998). A subsequent study of 1998
outcomes indicates that the employers' win rate increased to ninety-five percent.
256. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants?, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99 (1999).
257. Id. at 101-102.
258. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO
ST. LJ. 239 (2001).
259. See generally TRIBE, supra note 121; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). Views strongly diverge on McDonnell Douglas. Compare, for example, Deborah
C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 223738 (1995) (arguing for the abandonment of McDonnell Douglas for a "less structured approach to disparate treatment cases"), with William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and
Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTs. &
EMP. PoL'Y]. 361 (1998) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas is still valuable for both structural
and symbolic reasons).
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applicant with a disability, while also having to assert her qualifications, would have a much more difficult time surviving summary
judgment because of judicial presumption regarding her competence. The scenarios are the same, yet the initial juridical
presumptions regarding competence are diametrically opposed.
In sum, having first brought into the ADA welfarist notions of
the disability classification through the adoption of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability, Congress then further reinforced
the Cleburne framework by adopting the Rehabilitation Act's requirement that Title I and II claimants also prove their
qualifications. Thus, although Congress very clearly intended to
rebut the presumptions utilized by the Cleburne Court, and although the ADA's defining language does not reference
competence, because of poor drafting it unintentionally bolstered
stereotypes of incompetence and the methodology which embeds
such stereotypes in interpretations of the law.

C. The Disability Classification
There remains the question of the justice of reducing opportunity for all of a class to protect some of its members or to protect
the public from some of them. This is the fundamental question of
when the state may reduce opportunities for all of a group as a
strategy for constraining some of its members. To illustrate, the
dissenting Justices in Goesart question whether there is arbitrary
discrimination between male and female bar owners and the bur260
den the state's preventative measures place on the latter. While
the former might be absent from their bars irresponsibly, leaving
wives, daughters, and female employees "without such protecting
oversight," 261 the latter are not free to tend their own bars nor employ their daughters to do so "even if a man is always present in the
. h ment to k eep ord er. ,262
establIS
A seemingly logical, but ultimately fallacious, method of avoiding the problem of categorically burdening members of the class is
to make properties associated with dependency and disruptiveness
definitive of the classification. To do so would mean that only dependent or disruptive individuals would meet the definition for
membership in the classification. Whoever does not display
260.
261.
262.

Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 468 (1948) (Rutledge,J., dissenting).
/d. at 466.
/d. at 468.
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dependency or disruptiveness would fall outside the classification
and in theory would not be burdened by restrictions placed on the
classification's population.
If the class protected by the ADA is constructed this way, logic
places asymptomatic individuals with HIV, for example, within the
classification in view of the kinds of moral and social considerations that weighed heavily in Bragdon, even if these are individuals
who defer the disease's symptoms with medication. On the other
hand, there are few if any similar moral and social problems associated with individuals who mitigate their diabetic symptoms with
medication, and these individuals fall outside the classification.
Thus, the construction of the disability classification within the
Cleburne framework appears able to exclude by stipulative definition people who are biologically anomalous but who are of a kind
that presently does not present moral or social problems to the
state. Drawing the classification this way makes the states' interest
in special treatment of the class a logical certainty rather than an
open empirical question. Arguably, maintaining the rationality of
the state's interest in treating some citizens differently requires
empirical proof that the state's characterizations of them are true.
It follows that questions about whether the state has a rational
interest in treating some citizens differently should not be resolved
simply by stipulating class characteristics or acceding to customary
characterizations, regardless of whether these truly describe most
members of the class.
Relying on stipulated characterizations of classes invites stereotyping the classes' members. Therefore, answers to such questions
should be determined empirically by unbiased, systematic, comprehensive examination of facts about the class's extension.
Interpretation of the disability classification should be subject to a
similar fact-finding process, rather than to the stipulative methodology imposed by the Cleburne framework. The Goesart Court
turned aside such appeal to fact about the classification of
263
women. Evidence adduced by exactly such fact-finding about
women impelled the Cleburne Court to draw the line it did between
gender and disability classifications. It drew this line because it
took empirical evidence about the competence of women to be
relevant to the female classification, but disregarded the relevance
of empirical evidence of competence to the disability classification.
For political reasons, neither Congress nor the political arm of
the disability community has faced the question of whether the

263.

See discussion of Goesart sufrra Part I.
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concept of disability has to have a univocal statutory meaning.
Only if it does must the class of people eligible for protection from
discrimination aimed at their physical or mental anomalies be
identical, or even intersect significantly, with the class of people
who receive monetary benefits or special services from being classified as disabled. Almost no one asks whether the class of disabled
eligible for special educational services should be identical to the
class of disabled protected against exclusion from ordinary educational services. Clearly both the reasons and the methods for
selective treatment for one purpose-compensating for dysfunction due to disability-are enormously different from the reasons
for selective treatment for another purpose-protecting against
discrimination due to disability. As the criteria for class membership should be related to the purpose for which the class is
delineated, there is no reason to think that the classes relevant to
different types of legislation are identical, or reducible to one another, even if it happens that their members are the same (they are
extensionally equivalent).
It is now well established that we tend to form categories around
prototypical experiences of salient instances that serve as emblem265
atic of the categories. That is to say, we take the properties of
individuals who stand out in a category or capture our attention,
and make these properties boundary markers of the entire category, so that all its members are assumed to possess them. This
cognitive tendency may be magnified when we imagine the most
salient members of a category to be the most in need, or otherwise
266
deserving of attention.
So, in an era like our own that is
264. A dispositive answer to this question is far beyond the ambition of this Article.
Some initial takes on the matter are included in Part B of AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAw FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 87-162 (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000).
265. Eleonor Rosch, Principles ofCategorizatian, in CoGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 2748 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978).
266. The Court's discussion in Garrett illustrates how the salience of instances of great
neediness captures attention even when they do not relate to the case in hand. In Garrett,
the Court stipulated that it is rational to hire employees who can use existing facilities and
to hold to "job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled."
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955, 959 (2000). The Court thus made remodeling facilities and revising job qualifications emblematic of what it takes to give disabled people access
to the workplace.
However, when Director of Nursing Patricia Garrett attempted to return to work after
treatment for breast cancer, she was "informed ... she would have to give up her Director
position," id. at 961, even though having had breast cancer in no way diminished her qualifications or competence, nor did her illness affect her use of existing facilities. See id.
Neither did prison guard Milton Ash, an asthmatic whose case was consolidated with
Garrett's, seek facilities remodeling or job qualification allowances. See id. His physician
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entranced with difference, justice may seem to require attention to
the greatest differences that distinguish groups from one another.267 The greatest gap that may seem to exist between people
with and without disabilities is the distance between the latter's
species-typical capability to function independently, and the incapability and consequent dependence of the most dysfunctional
members of the former group. Some may think that responses to
disability are insensitive if they do not focus on the welfare of that
subset of individuals in the disabled population who are most dysfunctional in the sense of having the least potential to function
268
independently.
recommended that he not be assigned to work in areas polluted with cigarette smoke and
to drive cars with carbon monoxide leaking into the interior compartment. /d. Arguably,
compliance with these recommendations required no "special" accommodation because
the pollutants Ash sought to avoid were already prohibited by "no smoking" and vehicle
maintenance standard regulations. Nevertheless, in determining the justice of Garrett's and
Ash's claims to equality of treatment in the workplace, the Court took needs atypically
greater than what is usual for the classification as paradigms. See id. at 958-69.
267. Some theorists believe that dominant groups secure their identity and elicit solidarity by constructing negative accounts of the similarities among their members. Thus,
whiteness "has no content but is rather a negation, the identity of not-being-black." Orlando
Patterson, America's Wont Idea, N.Y. TIMES BooK REv., Oct. 22, 2000, 51, at 15 (reviewing
Scorr L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD (2000)). Iris Marion Young also provides an
analysis of abjection to explain why the majority of people treat individuals with disabilities
as "other." IRIS MARION YOUNG, jUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, 141-48 (1990).
Also of interest is David Mitchell's and Sharon Snyder's claim that the record of representing disability in the visual and literary media is a history of "metaphorical opportunism."
David T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder, Introduction: Disability Studies and the Double Bind of
Representation, in THE BODY, IN THEORY: HISTORIES OF CULTURAL MATERIALISM 1, 17 (David
T. Mitchell & Sharon L. Snyder eds., 1997). Mitchell and Snyder believe that there is a "pervasive cultural and artistic dependency upon disability," id. at 12, and they indict the culture
for colonizing people with various kinds of impairments and exploiting their images in
order to nourish nondisabled people's fictions about their own perfections. See id. at 15
("Readers' experience of the dual pleasures of fascination and repulsion [with physical
difference] also evolve out of an ability to leave the site of a fiction with our own membership in normalcy further consolidated and assured."). However, for a critique of some of
Mitchell & Snyder's theoretical claims, see Anita Silvers, From the Crooked Timher of Humanity,
Beautiful Things Can be Made, in BEAUTY MATTERS: NEW THEORIES OF BEAUTY (Peg Zeglin
Brand ed., 2000). Theories on which dominant group identities are constructed oppositionally, based on denials of unfavorable attributes assigned to subordinate classifications,
necessarily focus on salient differences, even if these do not truly characterize the minority
groups' members.
268. See generaUy HANS S. REINDERS, THE FUTURE OF THE DISABLED IN LIBERAL SociETY: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2000). Reinders argues that tension exists between genetic
screening used to give parents the option of terminating a pregnancy upon the discovery of
a genetic defect and the view we have as members of a society towards disabled citizens. Part
of the weighing process used to decide whether to have a child with a genetic defect is to
imagine living with a disabled child, which requires making a judgment on the value of a
disabled person. Id. See also ROBERT M. 'VEATCH, THE FOUNDATIONS OF jUSTICE: WHY THE
RETARDED AND THE REsT OF Us HAvE CLAIMS TO EQUALITY (1986) (arguing for an egalitarian response to the needs of the disabled, grounding the approach in both religious and
secular premises).
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There is, then, an understandable inclination to imagine the
main usage of the disability classification to be in support of the
state's interest in responding to these members' special needs. But
the most conspicuous differences are not always the fairest markers
of the boundaries between groups. Further, only if the groups are
logically identical, rather then merely contingently intersecting,
can it be fair to visit burdens on members of one group as the
price of benefits allocated to members of the other group.
IV.

REVISING THE DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION

We demonstrated above that the methodology utilized by the
Supreme Court in conceptualizing the disability classification is
retrogressive, closely analogous to the one it applied to women
269
more than fifty years ago in Goesart. We also illustrated how the
framework annunciated in Cleburne perpetuated differential
treatment under the law of people with disabilities based upon
custom and convention, rather than upon an empirical enquiry
270
about what is factual. We now turn to the question of what kind
of change would be required to amend the Court's incongruent
jurisprudence and achieve methodological consistency in the
mode of analysis it applies to groups of biologically different
individuals.
As a matter of logical consistency and judicial conservatism, the
Court could hold that when examining statutes or practices affecting the disabled as a group, courts ought to proceed from the
same baseline utilized for assessing the rights of women. As a practical matter, this would entail an initial presumption that the
prevalent characteristic of members of the disability classification is
their competence to perform the social function at issue, with a
sub-category of individuals within the classification who will be unable to so function. This presumption will either be borne out or
disproved by empirical evidence when particular state actions are
challenged.
We do not, therefore, argue for the abolition of "rational" discrimination, nor of classification on the basis of characteristics that
act as proxy where there are not empirical indicators of those

269.
270.

See supra Parts I and II.
See supra Part II.
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271

characteristics. What we take issue with is the selection of proxy
272
characteristics based upon empirically unfounded stereotypes
273
that lead to the general exclusion of all people with disabilities,
regardless of competence or qualification. We urge that generalizations about whether the disabled, as distinct from a carefully
drawn and substantiated sub-category of the classification are biologically unable to perform particular social functions, should be
grounded in an empirical analysis rather than reliant upon social
convention.
To adopt this approach fits comfortably with the judicial conservatism typifying the majority of current Justices, for it imposes
methodological consistency on the Court's treatment of groups
that are candidates for constitutional protection from discrimination. Nor would application of this standard require the Court to
engage in dramatic social engineering, for the only current practice that would not prevail would be that founded on empirically
unproven generalizations and stereotypes about the disabled.
Adopting a constitutionally neutral disability classification that
does not stipulate its members' incompetence, and therefore does
not make the benefits of differential treatment based on the classification presumptive, would jettison outmoded ideas about the
disabled on the same basis that prompted the Cleburne Court to
jettison outmoded ideas about women.
Unless the Court does so, judicial consideration of disabled
people will be mired in circularity. Applied to the disability
classification, the methodology we recommend would ensure that
judicial examinations of whether disabled individuals are
biologically able to execute particular social functions are not
271. See generaUy, GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971)
(seminal trealment of the effects of discrimination, written by a Nobel Prize winning
economist).
272. Unfounded labor productivity assumptions are discussed in Michael Ashley Stein,
Market Failure and ADA Title I, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS
OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 193 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000). See generaUy, Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Part ll-Patents and Innuvations in Assistive Technology, 12 NoTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pus. PoL'Y 9, 85-89 (1998) (recognized as the seminal work on accommodation costs); Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitude, Behavior, and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345 (1997) (exploring the concept of accommodation costs); Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I - Workplace Accommodations, 46
DEPAUL L. REv. 887 (1997) (same).
273. This is so, even when the authors attempt what they perceive to be a pro-disability
rights position. See, e.g., Scott A Moss & Daniel A Malin, Public Funding For Disability Accom11U}dations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARv. C.RC.L. L. REv. 197, 200--01 ( 1998); Sue A Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx.
L. REv. 1969, 1975--78 (1994).
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mere reflections of precisely those constrictive conventions or
customs whose truth plaintiffs with disabilities are trying to
challenge at trial. Such a methodological adjustment will not result
in special protections for the disabled but will simply extend the
same protections against biased characterization granted to other
groups that historically have been deprived of opportunity by the
conventionalization of false beliefs about them.
We argue that such rigorous reconstruction of the disability classification is required to avoid the artificial imposition of limitations
implicit in categorizations devised for narrow legislative purposes
from being mistaken for natural constraints on the potential and
freedom of people with disabilities. The practical effects of realizing the kind of methodological consistency we are urging can be
illustrated by a comparison of the influence of the Cleburne doc274
trine in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. with what
might change were a Cleveland decision developed within a neutral
framework.
75
In Cleveland, the Court settled a growing inter-circuit conflice
arising from circumstances in which disabled individuals claimed
statutory protections under the differing definitions of disability
276
contained in the ADA and the Social Security System. At issue
was whether the assertion, made for the purposes of receiving Social Security Disability Income (SSDI), that a person was
277
completely disabled from working precluded the same individual
from later asserting in an ADA complaint that she was a work capable (and thus qualified) person with a disability. 278 The Court
held, unanimously, that disabled plaintiffs were under a burden of
showing that their work dysfunctions (which made them eligible
for public benefits) could be nullified by ADA-mandated reason279
able accommodations.
The Court found that the ADA and SSDI classifications were not
280
co-extensive, but merely overlapping. The Court further found
that an "SSA representation of total disability differs from a purely
281
factual statement." Nevertheless, Carolyn Cleveland was placed
under a burden of constructing an explanation, sufficient to meet

u.s. 795 (1999).

274.
275.
276.

526

279.
280.
281.

/d. at 798, 806.
/d. at 803.
/d. at 802.

See id. at 800.
See generally Anne E. Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: judicial Estoppel and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1529 (1996).
277. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797.
278. /d.
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a reasonable juror standard, of the discrepancy between her declaration of eligibility for disability benefits granted to those whose
impairments make them too dysfunctional to work and her declaration of being able to work if reasonable adjustments to work sites
or practices were made. By extrapolation, a similar burden would
be borne by other people with disabilities who can be productive
under appropriate working conditions, but not under the barrierridden conditions maintained by their current employers.
Yet it is unclear as to why these individuals are required to carry
282
such a burden at the summary judgment level. Why should they
carry the burden of explaining away presumptive inconsistencies
when the Court's own analysis shows that the claims at issue are
not inconsistent? According to the Court, the first claim, on which
disability is equivalent to the inability to work, refers to an administrative classification and often is determined to be true as a matter
283
of definitional convention. The second claim, on which disability
is not equivalent to the inability to work, refers purely to facts
about a particular person's competences and is always determined
to be true as a matter of empirical observation and demonstration
rather than definitional convention. As on the Court's own analysis
these claims make logically different kinds of attributions and
284
mean different things in their references to disability, the logical
conclusion of the Court's holding should be that no burden exists
on the plaintiff to prove that she did not contradict herself. This is
borne out by its ruling that the claim to be a member of the SSDI
disability classification is not a claim about being disabled in fact,
but is instead a claim about satisfYing a certain procedure. Thus,
on the Court's own analysis, the claim that one is ADA-eligible is a
factual one, but the claim that one is SSDI eligible is a contextually-related legal construction. They are no more contradictory
than saying "I am tall and green," as opposed to saying "I am red
all over and green all over."
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer reasoned that Cleveland
could in fact be eligible under the ADA because a reasonable ac285
commodation could enable her to prove competence. But it
would not be in the state's interest to have to make determinations, for each of the 2.5 million annual seekers of various SSA
benefits, about whether there are specific accommodations that
286
might enable that individual to work. More than sixty percent of
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See id. at 798.
/d. at 804.
/d. at 801-07.
/d. at 803.
/d.
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the decisions that individuals cannot work at all, and therefore are
disabled for SSDI purposes, are made because the applicant has a
condition that the SSA lists as disabling, even though people with
287
these conditions may participate successfully in the workforce.
Despite the nonfactual basis of the disability classification for purposes of SSDI, Cleveland affirmed that courts should therefore
defer to this proxy for work incapability. Thus, while explicitly recognizing that the class of disabled people referred to by the ADA is
not factually co-extensive with the class eligible to depend on disability benefits, the Court decided that the ADA definition of
disability should be viewed as stipulatively coextensive with SSA
classifications, with the burden falling on individual litigants to
288
prove otherwise in particular cases.
What results from this stipulation of counterfactual coextensivity? Under this holding, members of the class of people with
biological anomalies are faced with a preponderance of burdens
over benefits, for they are individually placed under the onus of
proving competence, rather than having this presumption made in
their favor. With its Cleveland ruling, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its commitment to the Cleburne framework which postulates a class
of disabled individuals who cannot effectively function in society,
with an ancillary sub-class who can. In contrast, the methodologically consistent approach that we advocate would have compelled
the Supreme Court in Cleveland to presume that individuals claiming equal protection from discrimination under the ADA are
competent, unless employers or others could show that they really
were not. This presumption is reflective of known facts about the
class in question.
Quantitative examination of current definitions of disability utilized by the state for social welfare programs allocating disability
benefits, and for legal protections such as the ADA, produces a
chart constituted by overlapping Venn circles rather than a mutually inclusive classification. From an empirical perspective, the class
of people who receive benefits from various state operated programs (such as SSI or vocational rehabilitation), and the class of
people with biological anomalies usually identified as "disabled" at
times overlap, but are not coterminous. At present, the Census Bureau classifies nearly twenty percent of Americans, or some 54

287.
288.

!d. at 804.
See id. at 805-06.
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million people, as having some kind of disability. 289 At the same
time, the number of individuals with disabilities receiving disability
payments based on their own disability was 9.1 million as of De290
cember 1999. Although some adjustment must be made to
harmonize the samples so that their cohorts are coterminous, what
is clear is that these two figures are neither equal nor coextensive,
the overall disability figure eclipsing the benefits figure.
This categorical overlap, i.e., the existence of some portion of
people with disabilities receiving social benefits for a stateacknowledged inability to work who are functionally capable of
291
working, has been well documented. At the forefront of empirical findings is research emanating from the Cornell Rehabilitation
Research and Training Center for Economic Research on Em292
ployment Policy for Persons with Disabilities.
In sum, the
findings of economists funded by the Center demonstrate that the
poor business cycle of the early 1990s, in combination with the
protected nature of SSI/SSDI recipients during the concurrent
welfare reforms, and favorable health benefits provided under
those public assistance programs, induced disabled individuals to
293
forego entering the labor market. What is crucial to this analysis
is the factual existence of a "transfer population": individuals with

289. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep"t of Commerce, Census Brief 97-5, Disabilities Affect
One-Fifth of All Americans, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/
cenbr975.pdf.
290. /d.
291. Neither the general public nor the disability community takes sufficient care to
distinguish between disability benefits and reasonable accommodations. The former constitute differential treatment to compensate disabled people for their personal limitations.
The latter constitute equal treattnent to indemnify disabled people against social limitations. To illustrate, for several years San Francisco airport was required to charge the lower
long-term parking lot fees to drivers with disabilities who parked in the short-term parking
lot. This was an accommodation made because the shuttles from the long-term parking lot
were not wheelchair accessible. The solution was unsatisfactory, however, because many of
the drivers classified as disabled did not use wheelchairs and were capable of using existing
shuttles. Here, holding a disabled parking placard was made a proxy for the disability classification but this created an overinclusive classification and exposed all members to lengthy
eligibility checks. The problem finally was resolved with the purchase of wheelchair accessible long-term parking shuttles and the consequent elimination of the need to
accommodate long-term disabled parkers in the short-term lot.
292. The website and research papers are available online at http://
www.ilr.cornell.edu/ rrtc/.
293. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How Policy Variables Influence the Timing of Slr
cial Security Disability Insurance Applications, Richard V. Burkhauser et al., How Working Agt~
People With Disabilities Fared Over the 1990's Business Cycle; David C. Stapleton et al., Transitions
from AFDC to SSI Prior to Welfare Reform; David C. Stapleton & Adam F. Tucker, WiU Expanding
Health Care Coverage For People With Disabilities Increase Their Empluyment and Earnings? Evidence
From An Analysis of the SSI Work Incentive Program. These papers are all available at
http:/ /www.ilr.cornell.edu/ped/dep/rrtc.html.
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disabilities who were employable, but nonetheless remained eligi294
ble for SSI/SSDI benefits under those programs' definitions.
The category of individuals with disabilities receiving public assistance who are functionally capable of working was recognized by
national policymakers in passage of the Ticket to Work and Work
Incentives Improvement Act, which extended the length of time
that people with disabilities receiving public assistance could continue to receive health care coverage after obtaining gainful
295
employment. Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the ADA,
on july 26, 2000, the Clinton Administration announced a series of
policy initiatives intended to allow people with disabilities cur. rently receiving Social Security disability-related benefits to earn
296
more income without losing cash benefits. It is reasonable to
suppose that further empirical study will show similar results for
more specialized disability benefits programs. It is also reasonable
to suppose that the majority of individuals who find themselves
identified with the disability classification do not benefit from this
assignment.
Had the Court pursued a fact-based enquiry about the part of
the population reported to be identified as disabled in the Census,
it would have discovered several bases for the logical disconnect
between the disability classification that has burdened people classified as disabled, and the disability classification emanating from
state activities that offer material benefits to people classified as
disabled. First, statutory definitions of "disability" vary among state
297
and federal definitions. Second, many disabled people acquired

294. Anticipating this result, economists Maijorie Baldwin and Richard Burkhauser
have been critical of the ADA and its lack of workplace initiatives. See Maijorie L. Baldwin,
Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 37
(1997); Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Am Pef1Jle with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549
ANNALS AM. AcAo. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 71 (1997).
295. Section 202(a), for example, extends Medicare coverage for SSDI recipients returning to work to six and one-half years. See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act ofl999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999).
296. Full details of the increase in the allowable substantial gainful activity level (SGA)
under SSDI and SSI are set forth in a White House press release. See Press Release, White
House, Clinton-Gore Administration Announces New Action Promoting Home and Community Based Services and Housing Options for People with Disabilities (July 25, 2000),
available at http:/ /www.pub.whitehouse.gov/ uri-res/12R?um:pdi:/ /oma.eop.gov.us/2000/
7/25/10.text.l. Further information on SGA and trial work period changes are available
through the Social Security Administration's website at http:/ /www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/
newsga.htm.
297. These are laid out in Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing judicial
Roadblocks that Prroent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26 HoFSTRA L. REv. 377 (1997). Their intersection, as well as a pre-Cleveland proposal
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their disabilities after the times of life when participation in dis298
ability programs, such as special education, was appropriate.
Third, many disabled people maintain employment free of involvement with vocational rehabilitation services. Fourth, and most
pertinently, neither degree nor kind of biological anomaly determines productivity and other competencies. 299 Two individuals may
have identical physical limitations. One of them may be designated
incapable of employment and thus is classified as disabled for purposes of receiving income support, while the other, identically
disabled as far as vulnerability to disability discrimination goes,
holds a job and thus is not classified as disabled for purposes of
receiving income support.
Accordingly, an empirical examination by the Cleveland Court
into the characteristics of members of the disability classification
would have resulted in a holding grounded in the fact that people
with disabilities as a class are capable of engaging in the social
·function of work, even if a subset categorically are not. When
Cleveland and others like her assert membership in an administratively defined SSA disability classification, they would be
understood as claiming to conform to one of the designations of
biological anomaly stipulated by the SSA as entitling entry into the
300
classification. As well, they would be presumed to contend their
inability to perform their own jobs, or others for which they are
qualified, not categorically but under contingently existing workplace conditions. Because the ADA construes failure to change
certain kinds of exclusionary conditions as discriminatory, ADA
plaintiffs' burden of proof at trial usually is in regard to the reasonableness of accommodating their biological anomalies by
changing such conditions. Thus, ADA plaintiffs also contend the
inability to perform their jobs under existing workplace conditions, but not categorically. They make a further claim, not at issue
in regard to SSA classifications, about the reasonableness of altering certain of the conditions that currently obtain in a specific
workplace.
for how to reconcile potential conflicts, is set forth in Beaumont, This Estoppel Has Got to
Stop: judicial Estoppel and the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 276.
298. For example, 52.5% of people become disabled after the age of 65, 18.7% from
ages 15 through 64. These, as well as additional facts regarding the age of 'onslaught" of
disability are set forth by the Census Bureau, and are available online at
http:/ /www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/ cenbr975.pdf.
299. For a discussion of current economic assumptions about productivity, see Michael
Ashley Stein, Labar Markets, Rationality, and Workerl with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 314 (2000).
300. To prove her general inability to work under SSA procedures, Cleveland simply
addressed "the extent of her injuries." Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 799.
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Contrary to the Cleveland Court, ADA plaintiffs should in the
main be permitted to ignore their previous SSDI contentions, yet
survive summary judgment motions. First, there is no inconsistency
in principle between SSDI eligibility contentions and ADA reasonable accommodation contentions. Second, by extending the
Cleburne framework, the Cleveland decision has bolstered categori~
cal presumptions against the competence of disabled individuals.
This raises a public policy consideration, for employers encouraged by such legal presumptions may take a worker's biological
anomaly as a proxy that permits or invites expulsion from the
workplace.

V.

CONCLUSION: DISABILITY CLASSIFICATIONS
AND NATURAL KINDS

An often voiced criticism of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence is that it illegitimately converts legal categories into "natural
01
kinds."g That is, the Court is thought to take as "natural" fact the
deficiencies of certain groups of people who are subject to disadvantageous statutory treatment and to suppose that they are of a
kind naturally deserving of such burdens. The criticism is that such
assertions do not refer to independent facts but instead are expressions prompted by cultural lacks and biases. To illustrate,
Amsterdam and Bruner comment that "[a] 'cripple' becomes a
less natural category to the extent that prosthetic technologies become available; it is a particularly natural category when a culture
not only lacks technological resources but regards physical afflictions as punishments for one's misbehavior in a prior life."g02
Our analysis indicates that this criticism may not be completely
on target. A kind is natural if it exists independent of human classificatory processes. That is, natural kinds are described rather than
defined. The properties of any natural kind are a matter of fact, to
be determined through the empirical study of that kind. The
Court's retrogressive methodology in the wrongly decided and
problematic cases we have examined was the opposite of what we
would expect if the classifications at issue were being treated as
natural kinds. The Court viewed legislative or administrative stipulation or definition, not empirical study, as the decisive factor in
301.

& BRUNER, supra note 232, at 50, 247. See also
supra note 148, at 106.
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 232, at 50.
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these cases in determining the properties of members of the class
under consideration. Thus, the Court was led to characterize the
larger group of people with disabilities in terms of properties
drawn from the stipulated definition of disability embedded in welfarist legislation rather than in terms of properties verified by
open-minded empirical study.
We recognize that reconceiving the disability classification as an
empirical category is not a simple task. Like general facts about
other empirical kinds, what is generally true of disabled people
evolved historically as physical and social conditions changed over
time. To learn these truths requires careful empirical study of the
capabiliti~s of disabled people today. Yet to respect these truths
and stimulate the learning process, the Court need only commit
itself to the principle that empirical reality overrides stipulative
convention.

